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HE treatment of custom has been widely debated in many ar-
eas of the law.1 In contract law, for example, there is a devel-
 
1 Custom has been used to mean many different things, from regularly occurring in-
dustry practices, to social norms, to ongoing practices that have existed from time 
immemorial. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 
2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 712 n.7 
(1999) (defining custom as “an unwritten practice that would be considered a usage of 
trade under the [Uniform Commercial] Code” or that would be used to interpret a 
contract under the Code); Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associ-
ated Press: Custom and Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85, 
85 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, INS] (defining custom in unfair competition context as 
“what the community has customarily regarded as binding social rules”); Richard A. 
Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law 
of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, The T.J. Hooper] (defining 
custom in the tort context as industry practices); Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the 
Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26 J. Legal Stud. 377, 377 n.1 (1997) (defining a 
T 
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oped literature analyzing whether industry practices should be read 
into contracts as implied terms and also, less controversially, 
whether such practices should inform the interpretation of existing 
contract terms.2 Similarly, in tort law, there is an ongoing discussion 
about whether the development of customary safety precautions by 
a particular industry should be an absolute defense to tort liability, 
no defense at all, or simply some evidence of negligence or lack 
thereof.3 In property law, the public’s long-standing customary use 
of an area of land has sometimes formed the basis of a right to con-
tinue to use this land despite competing private property claims.4 
Despite all this talk of custom in other areas of law, there has 
been relatively little theoretical discussion of how custom is and 
should be treated in the context of intellectual property (“IP”). 
One reason for this is that scholars have not appreciated the role of 
customary practices in IP law. Professor Clarisa Long, for example, 
has observed that in contrast to real property, intellectual goods 
 
“norm” as a “common pattern of commercial behavior, rather than a ‘moral norm’ 
that purports to distinguish between good and bad behavior”); Richard H. McAdams, 
The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 340 (1997) 
(defining norms as “informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to fol-
low because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal 
sanctions, or both”); Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1697, 1699 (1996) (defining a “norm” as a nonlegal rule developed and 
enforced by a community rather than the state); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
711, 740 (1986) (referring to “custom” in the Blackstonian sense of continuous uses of 
land by the public since time immemorial). 
 Despite their differences, all of these forms of custom share the common character-
istic of being rules developed outside the legal system by communities or industries 
that have extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms. I therefore use the term “custom” 
broadly to include industry practices, community-developed standards of behaviors 
(sometimes referred to as norms), common community practices, and practices dating 
from time immemorial. A more detailed examination of the distinctions between the 
categories of custom is outside the scope of this Article. See generally Jack P. Gibbs, 
Norms: The Problem of Definition and Classification, 70 Am. J. Soc. 586 (1965) (dis-
cussing the difficulties of defining the term “norm”). 
2 See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1; Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: 
Disentangling Informal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 821 (1999) [hereinafter Epstein, Confusion]. 
3 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Tort Law 132–33 (1987); Epstein, The T.J. Hooper, supra note 1; Clarence Morris, 
Custom and Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147 (1942). 
4 See, e.g., Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676–78 (Or. 1969); see also 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *76; Rose, supra note 1, at 713–14. 
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and legal regimes are “unaided by long-standing customary defini-
tions, communal norms, or widespread social understandings.”5 
Professor Stephen Carter has concluded that IP transactions are 
“so heavily regulated that there is less and less space for private 
ordering to emerge.”6 Similarly, litigants and courts in IP cases 
have failed to identify when they are relying on customary prac-
tices, and even in the few instances where there is some recognition 
that custom is involved, they do not consider the broader implica-
tions of considering such practices. 
Nevertheless, custom has a tremendous influence on IP law. 
Custom has a powerful impact on what is happening in the 
trenches of creative and other industries and spills over into the 
governing legal regimes. For example, there is a general industry 
practice among most users of IP, especially those who work for lar-
ger institutions or who intend to distribute their works publicly, to 
clear or license all uses of others’ IP. This is true even when there 
are strong fair use, First Amendment, or other defenses to the uses 
and even when the underlying work is not, in fact, protected by IP 
laws. These industry clearance practices then influence the govern-
ing legal regime because courts often consider nonconformity with 
an industry’s clearance practices as a basis to reject any defense to 
the use of another’s IP without the explicit consent of the IP 
owner. 
In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, for example, the 
producers of a television sitcom used a poster of the plaintiff’s art-
work in the background of a set without permission.7 The poster 
was visible for less than thirty seconds, was never the focal point of 
any shot, was not referred to in the dialogue, and was lawfully pur-
chased.8 Nevertheless, the court rejected a fair use defense in the 
copyright infringement action because the producers had failed to 
follow the TV and film industry custom of licensing copyrighted 
works used as set-dressing.9 If not for the consideration of industry 
 
5 Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 484 
(2004). 
6 Stephen L. Carter, Custom, Adjudication, and Petrushevsky’s Watch: Some Notes 
from the Intellectual Property Front, 78 Va. L. Rev. 129, 131 (1992). 
7 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997). 
8 Id. at 72–73. 
9 Id. at 81 (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985)) (rely-
ing on failure to pay the “customary price” as a basis for rejecting a fair use defense to 
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clearance practices, the producers would likely have prevailed in 
their fair use defense.10 
Even when courts do not get involved, the gatekeepers in the sci-
ence, media, and publishing worlds enforce the customary practices 
and norms. For example, the talented American writer Don De-
Lillo wanted to title a novel “Panasonic.” He has described his rea-
sons for viewing “Panasonic” as essential for use as his title: 
“The novel is filled with the sounds of people’s voices, with si-
rens, loudspeakers, bullhorns, kitchen appliances, with radio and 
TV transmissions, with references to beams, rays, sound waves, 
etc. . . . Jack, listening to people talk on the telephone and mus-
ing on his own death, thinks ‘all sounds, all souls.’ . . . Again the 
notion of pan-sonus connected to a fear of death. . . . Jack associ-
ates the god Pan with his fear of death.”11 
DeLillo’s publisher sought permission from the electronics com-
pany, Panasonic, for use of the name as the book title. When the 
company denied permission, DeLillo’s publisher demanded that 
DeLillo change the title of his book.12 Thus, even though nothing in 
trademark law should have prevented DeLillo from using Pana-
sonic as his title, his publishing company’s insistence on conformity 
with industry custom limited his artistic expression. 
While both of these examples reflect deeply engrained yet in-
formal clearance practices, many more formal customary practices 
 
copyright infringement). The court cited an amicus brief filed by the Artists Rights 
Society and the Picasso estate that listed numerous examples of other shows and films 
that licensed artwork in similar circumstances. Id. at 81 n.15; see also Brief for the 
Artists Rights Society and the Picasso Administration as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 4–5, id. 
10 The district court in Ringgold had held the use fair when it did not consider the 
film and television industry’s practice of licensing set dressing. Ringgold v. Black 
Entm’t Television, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1299, 1302 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Amsinck v. 
Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1046, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding 
unlicensed use of plaintiff’s mobile in a film was a fair use even though it was some-
times shown in close-up and appeared on screen for over one and one-half minutes); 
cf. Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216, 218 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding 
use of plaintiff’s photographs in the motion picture Seven noninfringing and de mini-
mis because the photographs were visible for less than thirty-six seconds and were not 
the focal point of the relevant shots). 
11 D.T. Max, Final Destination: Why Do the Archives of So Many Great Writers 
End Up in Texas?, New Yorker, June 11 & 18, 2007, at 54, 66. 
12 Id. at 66. 
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also govern the use of IP. Such practices include industry guide-
lines, agreements, and statements of “best practices.” One of the 
most influential of the IP guidelines is the Classroom Guidelines,13 
which were developed during the drafting of the 1976 Copyright 
Act. The Classroom Guidelines were developed and negotiated 
primarily by large publishers and a few author organizations with 
minimal to no input from educators and students.14 The Classroom 
Guidelines set forth recommended principles for determining when 
it is “fair” or lawful to use another’s copyrighted work in an educa-
tional setting.15 These guidelines, which were never adopted by 
statute, restrict how copyrighted works are used by educators and 
greatly influence courts when they analyze fair use claims.16 The 
Classroom Guidelines restrict the making of copies for students to 
circumstances in which tests for brevity, spontaneity, and cumula-
tive effect are met.17 The extreme specificity of the Classroom 
Guidelines stands in stark contrast to the open-ended nature of the 
statutory and common law fair use criteria, greatly restricting the 
possible uses of IP works by researchers, educators, and students.18 
These are just a few examples of the wide variety of ways that 
custom influences the scope of IP—both what IP owners can de-
mand and what users can do with others’ IP. The failure to recog-
nize the enormity of the role of custom in IP law not only exacer-
bates the current trend of expanding owners’ rights at the expense 
of users, but also jeopardizes several projects that seek to remedy 
this trajectory of IP law by expanding public access to IP. In par-
ticular, recent efforts by those who wish to expand the public’s ac-
cess to copyrighted and trademarked works by developing “best 
practices” and fair use guidelines have implicitly adopted a model 
of IP law that incorporates custom as law. A best practices state-
 
13 Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational 
Institutions, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83. 
14 See discussion infra Subsection I.A.2.b. 
15 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67–74, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680–
88; see also discussion infra Subsection I.A.2.b. 
16 See discussion infra Subsection I.A.2.b. 
17 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680–88; 
see also discussion Subsection I.A.2.b. 
18 Compare 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000), with H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70, as re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5681–83. See also discussion infra Subsection I.A.2.b. 
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ment developed for documentary filmmakers, for example, sug-
gests that “[f]air use is shaped, in part, by the practice of the profes-
sional communities that employ it.”19 The statement then sets forth 
guidelines for when, in the context of documentary filmmaking, 
uses of others’ IP should be permissible and when such uses should 
not be. Without considering the impact of such guidelines on courts 
or the theoretical basis for considering such customs, these “best 
practices” projects risk limiting rather than expanding public access 
to IP. Similarly, the effect of the recent development of alternative 
IP regimes by the “copyleft,”20 such as the Creative and Science 
Commons projects and the free and open-source software move-
ments, cannot be fully understood without evaluating how courts 
will enforce the community norms that play a large role in each 
movement.21 
In this Article, I challenge the widespread, though mostly im-
plicit, preference for incorporating custom into IP law. In Parts I 
and II of the Article, I discuss the significant impact that custom 
has on IP rights. I begin the discussion in Part I by surveying the 
most influential IP-related practices and norms. Most of the prac-
tices that I discuss have not previously been considered under the 
rubric of custom. Indeed, this is the first attempt to collect and ana-
lyze all of these practices in one place. I divide my discussion into 
two main categories of custom. The first category is practices and 
norms that have developed to avoid litigation when laws are uncer-
tain or the expense of litigation discourages resort to the legal sys-
tem. The second category is practices that have developed with the 
 
19 Ass’n of Indep. Video & Filmmakers et al., Documentary Filmmakers’ State-
ment of Best Practices in Fair Use 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/rock/backgrounddocs/bestpractices.pdf 
[hereinafter Filmmakers’ Statement] (emphasis added). 
20 A number of different origins have been attached to the term “copyleft,” but I use 
the term broadly to refer to the movement to limit the scope of copyright and provide 
greater public access to copyrighted works. 
21 Both the Creative and Science Commons movements and the free and open-
source software movements have developed licenses for copyrighted works and pat-
ents that can be used to provide greater access to those works than the default law al-
lows. See Creative Commons Homepage, http://creativecommons.org (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2007); Science Commons Homepage, http://sciencecommons.org (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2007); GNU Project Homepage, http://www.gnu.org (last visited Sept. 20, 
2007); OSS Homepage, http://opensource.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2007); see also dis-
cussion infra Subsection I.B.3. 
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goal of creating a preferred or aspirational allocation of IP rights. 
Industry practices, agreements, guidelines, and social norms have 
created a decentralized IP regime that has enormous influence on 
the use of IP and the scope of rights that, as a practical matter, IP 
holders can exercise. Such privately generated rules have substan-
tially expanded IP rights without the opportunity for the public to 
debate or participate in the governing regimes. 
In Part II, I build on this understanding of the de facto role of 
custom by developing a picture of the tremendous influence cus-
tom has on de jure IP law. In almost every instance in which courts 
have considered customary practices in IP cases, they have pointed 
to nonconformity with industry practices as a basis to reject de-
fenses to infringement or as a basis for finding infringement itself. 
Only rarely have courts referred to conformity with industry prac-
tices or community norms as a possible basis for a defense. Courts 
often rely on custom as a proxy in making other inquiries, such as 
determining the market effects of using another’s IP or deciding 
what are fair or reasonable uses of another’s IP. In this Part of the 
Article, I begin my critique of using custom as a proxy for these in-
dependent propositions. Courts also look at customary practices to 
determine what parties intended, often in the context of contracts 
related to IP or when interpreting patent claims, or to determine 
what is generally done in an industry. I conclude that such direct 
uses of custom generally are legitimate. 
In Part III of the Article, I elaborate on my critique of the incor-
poration of custom into IP law. I consider the three primary justifi-
cations for incorporating custom into the law and reject each in the 
context of IP. These justifications are the adoption of optimal 
rules, the fulfillment of expectations, and the promotion of auton-
omy interests. None is a convincing basis to incorporate custom 
into IP law. First, there is no reason to think that the customary 
practices that develop in the context of IP transactions will lead to 
an optimal development or allocation of IP.22 Industry-developed 
 
22 In discussions of custom, scholars have often used the term “optimal” when 
evaluating whether particular customs should be preferred over judge-made or statu-
tory laws. “Optimal” suggests that a rule is the best possible one. In the real world, 
one may never be able to achieve the best, nor, given differing opinions of what the 
evaluative metric should be for determining the best outcome, even agree on what the 
best outcome ought to be. I nevertheless continue to use the term, both because it is 
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practices are likely to be suboptimal because they are often gener-
ated by efforts to avoid litigation or to preserve relationships, 
rather than by efforts to develop optimal IP rules or even rules pre-
ferred by the involved parties. Customs that develop in the IP con-
text are also likely to be suboptimal because the IP industries are 
not particularly close-knit and have fewer repeat transactions be-
tween the same parties than other industries in which the use of 
custom has been favored by scholars. Moreover, the different eco-
nomic and political power of parties in IP markets means that the 
customary practices do not fairly represent the parties but instead 
skew toward the interests of the most powerful IP owners. 
Second, the use of custom in the context of IP generally does not 
further parties’ expectations of what should be the governing rules, 
and, even when it does, such expectations should not drive the de-
termination of IP rights because of countervailing public interests 
at stake that demand a minimum level of access to others’ IP. 
Third, my final criticism of a reliance on custom to determine the 
scope of IP rights is that autonomy interests that justify a prefer-
ence for private ordering in other areas of the law point in the op-
posite direction in IP law. The public goals inherent in affording IP 
rights cut against deference to private ordering in the IP context. 
Even though I conclude that custom should never provide a ba-
sis for creating dispositive legal rules in any IP case, custom con-
tinues to have some relevance and value as evidence for a variety 
of inquiries. There are inquiries in IP law, and elsewhere, for which 
customary practices are relevant and not unduly prejudicial. In 
such instances, it is appropriate and may be necessary for courts to 
consider evidence of custom. 
The central task of Part IV of this Article is to provide a theo-
retical framework for determining when particular customs are 
more or less valuable in IP cases. Although my analysis focuses on 
issues that arise in IP law, these insights also shed light on how cus-
tom should be evaluated in other areas of the law. I present six 
main vectors along which a custom should be situated to determine 
whether the custom is likely to provide meaningful information. 
 
common to the literature with which I engage and also because the alternatives carry 
with them their own baggage. My intention is for readers to interpret an “optimal” 
rule as the best possible one given certain real world constraints. See also infra note 
176. 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
1908 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 93:1899 
The vectors evaluate the certainty of the custom, the motivation 
for the custom, the representativeness of the custom, how the cus-
tom is applied (both against whom and for what proposition), and 
the implications of the custom’s adoption. To have any value, a 
custom must be certain. To determine whether there is a clear cus-
tom, it must be determined that the custom is uniformly recognized 
and supported, and that there are no contradictory or competing 
customs. Customary practices or norms that develop with the ex-
press purpose of formulating an aspirational set of practices should 
be given more weight than those that develop simply to avoid liti-
gation or to preserve relationships. Customs that develop with a 
diverse representation of interests, such as those of owners and us-
ers and big and small players in the IP industries, should be given 
more credence than those that are driven by self-interested sub-
groups. For similar reasons, a custom should generally only be ap-
plied against parties who participated in its development or, at 
least, who were adequately represented in the development of that 
custom. When custom is used simply to determine what is generally 
done or what parties intended in a contract or quasi contract, cus-
tom is at its most useful because it is not standing in for any sec-
ond-order inquiries. Even when customary practices have some 
value under the proposed framework, there should always be an 
independent analysis of what the adoption of a particular custom 
would mean for IP owners and users going forward. 
Left unchecked, customary practices threaten to swallow up IP 
law and replace it with industry-led IP regimes that give the public 
and other creators more limited rights to access and use intellectual 
property. The approach that I present for evaluating custom in the 
IP context is vital in the process of recalibrating IP and an impor-
tant step toward developing a more theoretical approach to evalu-
ating the allocation of IP rights. Such an approach also encourages 
both users and owners of IP to dissent from customary practices 
with which they disagree and to expressly identify the motivations 
behind particular practices and norms. 
Looking at custom through the lens of IP also provides powerful 
evidence for limiting the role of custom in the law more broadly 
and adds a compelling framework for understanding when prefer-
ence should be given to top-down government regulation and ad-
judication over decentralized private rulemaking. To the extent 
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custom can provide relevant data points, the framework that I de-
velop provides solid direction for future theorists and courts. 
I. THE INFLUENCE OF CUSTOM ON DE FACTO IP RIGHTS 
To date there has been little acknowledgement of the breadth of 
the customary practices and norms involved in IP and the vast in-
fluence that they wield. In this Part, I therefore have collected 
many different examples of IP practices and norms, and I examine 
the impact that they have on de facto IP rights. I divide my discus-
sion of the most influential IP practices and norms into two main 
categories on the basis of the primary motivation for the develop-
ment of the relevant practice or norm. The first category consists of 
practices or norms that have developed to avoid litigation when 
laws are uncertain or the expense of litigation discourages resort to 
the legal system. The second category of practices and norms that I 
consider are those that have developed with the goal of creating an 
ideal or aspirational allocation of IP rights, at least from the point 
of view of the party generating the norm or practice. 
A. Litigation-Avoidance Customs 
Litigation-avoidance customs are motivated by IP players’ (both 
owners and users) interests in providing greater certainty in the 
face of unpredictable legal outcomes and in reaction to skyrocket-
ing litigation costs.23 Not only does the cost of litigation often out-
weigh alternative arrangements between parties who want to use 
one another’s IP, but the consequences of losing in court are sub-
stantial. Even if no actual damages are caused by the use of a plain-
tiff’s work, statutory damages can be significant. Moreover, dam-
ages, statutory or otherwise, greatly increase if a willful violation is 
shown—something that courts often find when defendants fail to 
conform to customary practices.24 Additionally, attorney’s fees are 
 
23 The current average cost of copyright litigation through the trial level ranges from 
$290,000 to $1 million. American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of 
the Economic Survey 2007, at 25 (2007). Patent cases run substantially higher, averag-
ing from $600,000 to more than $5 million depending on the sum at risk. Id. Trade-
mark infringement litigation costs average from $255,000 to more than $1 million. Id. 
24 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000) (authorizing treble damages for intentional 
use of counterfeit marks); 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000) (authorizing statutory damages 
up to $150,000 for willful copyright infringements); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1997) 
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routinely awarded to the prevailing party, so a loss can mean pay-
ing legal fees that significantly exceed damages.25 The threat of in-
junctive relief also looms large because, if granted, such relief can 
destroy any chance of recovering the initial investment in a project. 
Recent expansions of criminal liability for copyright infringement 
further deter IP users from fighting court battles.26 
Not only do the costs and risks associated with litigation encour-
age the development of alternative practices, but uncertainties in 
IP law also encourage the creation of custom. Some of this uncer-
tainty is generated by the significant impact that changing technol-
ogy has had on the production and distribution of IP. For example, 
consider the evolution from copying by hand to the making of pho-
tocopies to the exchanging of digital files online. Other uncertain-
ties in IP law are generated by unpredictable legal standards. The 
prototypical example of this is copyright’s fair use defense. The de-
fense permits nonconsensual uses of another’s copyrighted work 
under certain circumstances, but those precise circumstances are 
not abundantly clear. Congress has set forth a four-factor analysis 
to evaluate fair use that is largely based on the common law.27 The 
 
(authorizing punitive damages for knowingly using “another’s name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness” without consent under California’s right of publicity statute); 
N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 51 (McKinney 1992) (authorizing exemplary damages under 
New York’s privacy statute for knowing use of another’s “name, portrait or picture” 
without consent); see also discussion infra Section II.B. Generally, only injunctive re-
lief is awarded in trademark infringement cases, but when a showing of willfulness is 
made, courts can award monetary damages for lost profits, costs, and fees. See 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1117(a). 
25 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117; 17 U.S.C. § 505; 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000). 
26 See 17 U.S.C. § 506; cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2000) (authorizing criminal liability for 
trafficking in counterfeit goods or services). 
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (D. Mass. 
1841) (No. 4901). Section 107 provides that:  
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in cop-
ies or phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use 
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered 
shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  
17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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multi-factor fair use analysis has been termed “muddled,” “trou-
blesome,” and “ad hoc.”28 Because of the uncertainty surrounding 
what constitutes a fair use, many players in the IP industries prefer 
to agree among themselves on some boundaries of fair use or play 
it safe by conforming to industry practices, such as licensing, rather 
than risk adverse court decisions if they guess wrong about a po-
tential fair use. 
1. The Clearance Culture 
One of the most dramatic examples of customary practices con-
trolling both de facto and de jure IP rights is the licensing practices 
of content and technology producers, creators, publishers, distribu-
tors, insurers, and other users of IP, including universities and li-
braries. Producers, publishers, and distributors of works and inven-
tions often require content producers and authors to license or 
“clear” all potentially protected IP works,29 even when there are 
strong defenses for such uses or when the protectability of the 
work or invention is questionable. Instead of challenging the valid-
ity of the copyright, trademark, or patent, or relying on fair use, 
First Amendment, or other defenses, IP users seek clearance. Pro-
fessors Patricia Aufderheide and Peter Jaszi have dubbed this 
preference for licensing the “clearance culture.”30 The clearance 
 
28 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (describing “the 
issue of fair use” as “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright”); Pierre N. 
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105 (1990) (expressing 
concern that because of the fair use doctrine’s lack of clarity, judges may evaluate fair 
use on the basis of “ad hoc perceptions of justice”); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A 
Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137, 1138–40 (1990) (terming 
fair use a “thicket” and the statutory provision “muddled” and “inconsistent”). 
29 I use the term “IP works” broadly to include any potentially copyrightable, 
trademarkable, or patentable properties, as well as publicity rights. Though I group 
trademarks and the right of publicity into this discussion, I do not endorse the treat-
ment of either as property. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and 
the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 199, 206 (2002) [hereinafter Rothman, 
Copyright Preemption]; Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at 
the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 105, 146–49 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion]. 
30 Patricia Aufderheide & Peter Jaszi, Ctr. for Soc. Media, Untold Stories: Creative Con-
sequences of the Rights Clearance Culture for Documentary Filmmakers 22 (2004), 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/files/pdf/UNTOLDSTORIES_Report.pdf. Aufder-
heide and Jaszi define the clearance culture as “the shared set of expectations that all 
rights must always be cleared.” Id. at 22. Others have also used this term. See, e.g., 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
1912 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 93:1899 
culture is primarily motivated by efforts to avoid litigation and op-
erates without regard to what IP law requires or what, as a norma-
tive matter, should be protected by IP rights. 
These clearance practices are firmly entrenched in all media, in-
cluding music, the fine arts, and publishing, as well as the biotech 
and high-tech industries. The excesses of the clearance culture can 
be seen, for example, in limits on the content of biographies. Even 
though courts have traditionally given great latitude to authors to 
refer to individuals, trademarks, and copyrighted works without 
permission in historical, nonfiction works,31 publishers routinely 
demand clearance of a subject’s copyrights, trademarks, and pub-
licity rights.32 Many of the potential IP claims in such circumstances 
are facially meritless, but risk-averse publishers and authors never-
theless are willing to abandon projects or follow the restrictions set 
forth by property holders.33 
The film and television industry also has a well-established prac-
tice of clearing all potentially copyrighted or trademarked works, 
as well as images and references to individuals, especially well-
known public figures.34 Even when fair use and First Amendment 
 
Marjorie Heins & Tricia Beckles, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Will Fair Use Survive? 
Free Expression in the Age of Copyright Control 5 (2005), available at 
http://www.fepproject.org/policyreports/WillFairUseSurvive.pdf; cf. Lawrence Lessig, 
Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture 
and Control Creativity (2004) [hereinafter Lessig, Free Culture] (contrasting current 
“lock down culture” with his preferred “free culture”). 
31 See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 
1990); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966); 
Seale v. Gramercy Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 337–38 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
32 See, e.g., D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppress-
ing Scholarship?, New Yorker, June 19, 2006, at 34, 38. 
33 For example, James Joyce’s grandson, Stephen Joyce, has intimidated numerous 
Joyce scholars and biographers into abandoning or severely cutting material out of 
projects about Joyce. Max, supra note 32, at 34, 38; see also Max, supra note 11, at 66 
(describing publishing companies’ restrictive IP policies). 
34 See, e.g., Testimony of Arthur Frankel, Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, 
Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (No. 78-Civ. 2417), reprinted in Excerpts of Record at 
419, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1981) (Nos. 81-7027, 81-7109) (testimony of former senior vice 
president of Paramount Television); Michael C. Donaldson, Clearance and Copyright: Eve-
rything the Independent Filmmaker Needs to Know 64, 214–15 (2d ed. 2003); Lloyd J. Jassin 
& Steven C. Schechter, The Copyright Permission and Libel Handbook: A Step-by-Step 
Guide for Writers, Editors, and Publishers 7, 43 (1998) (recommending clearing all poten-
tially copyrighted works without regard to possible fair use defenses and also recommending 
clearing public domain works); Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 30, at 5; Heins & Beckles, 
supra note 30, at 5; Ronald H. Gertz et al., Clearance of Rights for Motion Picture and Tele-
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defenses are quite strong, if not indisputable, clearances are de-
manded. Publicity rights are often cleared unnecessarily, such as 
when a publicity holder’s contract with a copyright holder clearly 
grants publicity rights for subsequent licensing purposes.35 For ex-
ample, the production and sale of an action figure of Obi-Wan 
Kenobi from the Star Wars movies should not require separate 
permission from Ewan McGregor and Alec Guinness if both actors 
have already assigned their publicity rights to the movie studio.36 
Similarly, television producers, networks, and studios will only ap-
prove the use of proper names if no one has that name in the re-
gion where the show takes place, or if at least three, and sometimes 
as many as ten, people have that name.37 The right of publicity nei-
ther mandates such numerical limits nor imposes liability for coin-
cidental use of a person’s name. Further, the right of publicity tra-
ditionally has not been thought to apply to entertainment or 
fiction.38 Routine licensing of publicity rights in entertainment con-
 
vision Productions, Century City Bar Ass’n J., Summer 1983, at 42, 43, 47–50 (recommending 
clearance of all “identifiable names, products, locations, companies[,] fictional characters[,]” 
film clips, and music used); Suzy Vaughan Assocs., Producers Guidelines, 
http://www.suzyvaughan.com/producers_guidelines.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2007) (recom-
mending licensing of any copyrighted work no matter how little is used or context and rec-
ommending clearing of some publicity rights, such as for individuals who appear on news 
programs); What Is Clearance, http://www.creativeclearance.com/whatisclearance.html (last 
visited Sept. 21, 2007) (recommending “clearance” of any work created by another per-
son(s)); discussion infra Part II and infra note 37. 
35 Most contracts today include such provisions, but even those from the relatively 
recent past often do not. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that there could be a right of publicity violation when derivative work 
based on characters from television show was prepared without permission of actors 
from original series). 
36 I have contended elsewhere that even if a contract does not grant such rights, 
copyright law should preempt publicity rights in such instances. See Rothman, Copy-
right Preemption, supra note 29, at 208–14, 259–62. I note that the Screen Actors 
Guild and the relevant collective bargaining agreements also influence clearance 
practices with regard to publicity holders’ rights, as well as concerns over actions for 
invasion of privacy, false light, and defamation. 
37 Email from Gregg Nations, Script Coordinator, Lost, ABC/Touchstone, to Jenni-
fer Rothman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, L.A. (Aug. 27, 2007, 
2:16:00 PDT) (on file with author); see also Donaldson, supra note 34, at 63, 214–15, 
237–38 (suggesting removal of all references in films to real people, whether living or 
dead, even if references were unintentional). 
38 See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439–40 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Courts 
long ago recognized that a celebrity’s right of publicity does not preclude others from 
incorporating a person’s name, features or biography in a literary work, motion pic-
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texts means that this understanding has virtually disappeared as a 
practical matter and is eroding as a de jure matter.39 
Consider the clearance demands for publicity rights in one re-
cent documentary, Camp Out, about teens who attend a Bible 
camp for gay Christian youth. The documentary features a teenage 
girl who is a huge fan of Elvis Presley. Her room is filled with Elvis 
postcards, tributes to Elvis, and other Elvis memorabilia. It would 
be impossible to show her room, or even understand her as a per-
son, without reference to the late singer. Nevertheless, the film-
makers were informed by their attorney that they should clear El-
vis’s publicity and trademark rights with his estate or remove all 
images of him from the film.40 The attorney’s position was largely 
driven by knowledge that the Elvis estate routinely sues parties 
that use images of Elvis without obtaining permission from the es-
tate.41 
Although the filmmakers were ultimately able to use the images 
of Elvis after paying a licensing fee, the Elvis estate easily could 
have declined to grant rights because of the film’s controversial 
subject or because the filmmakers could not afford the substantial 
 
ture, news or entertainment story. Only the use of an individual’s identity in advertis-
ing infringes on the persona.” (quoting George M. Armstrong, Jr., The Reification of 
Celebrity: Persona as Property, 51 La. L. Rev. 443, 467 (1991))); Seale v. Gramercy 
Pictures, 949 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that “use of a person’s name 
and likeness in news, entertainment, and creative works does not infringe on the right 
of publicity”); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 (1995); J. 
Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, §§ 8:90–:99, 8:302–:321 
(2006); Rothman, Copyright Preemption, supra note 29, at 206–07 & n.20; Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. Rev. 903, 908 
(2003). 
39 See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, 227 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(applying right of publicity to an action figure from a movie); Elvis Presley Enters. v. 
Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998) (applying right of publicity to nightclub 
name); Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1358–59 (D.N.J. 1981) (allow-
ing right of publicity action against Elvis impersonators); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, 
229 U.S.P.Q. 1015, 1016 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1986) (applying right of publicity to musical 
show about the Beatles); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 370–72 (Mo. 2003) 
(applying right of publicity to a comic book); see also Rothman, Copyright Preemp-
tion, supra note 29, at 206–07 & n.19. 
40 Email from Kirk Marcolina, Director & Producer, Camp Out, to Jennifer 
Rothman, Assoc. Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, L.A. (June 20, 2007, 12:35:20 
PDT) (on file with author). 
41 Id. 
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licensing fees.42 Even if the filmmakers would ultimately have pre-
vailed in any litigation involving the use of Elvis in the documen-
tary, they would have had trouble insuring, screening, or distribut-
ing the film absent proof of clearance.43 Moreover, the filmmakers 
would not have been able to afford the legal fees that would have 
been required to establish their legal right to use Elvis’s name and 
likeness. 
The clearance culture is not limited to the creative arts. Inven-
tors and developers often license patents when the validity of a 
patent is questionable or the infringing status of an inventor’s 
product is uncertain. Companies and attorneys often license to 
avoid expensive patent litigation and to avoid hold-up problems 
with a product that has already been developed or marketed.44 
Clearance culture practices have a profound influence on what 
gets made and the content of works that get produced. When li-
 
42 Clips from films can cost, depending on the value of the underlying work, up to 
$10,000 a minute. Aufderheide & Jaszi, supra note 30, at 19. Some networks charge 
upwards of $90 per second for news footage. Id at 8. To clear the song Happy Birth-
day costs $15,000–20,000 per verse. Id. at 11; see also Richard Feiner & Co. v. H.R. 
Indus., 10 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (noting that licensing fees for 
photographs are $5,000 to $6,500 per photograph). 
43 Heins & Beckles, supra note 30, at 5–6. Films regularly are covered by errors and 
omissions insurance, which, among other things, compensates a producer or distribu-
tor for litigation costs and damages related to claims for infringement of others’ IP. 
This type of insurance is commonly referred to as “E & O.” E & O insurers usually 
demand clearances for all potentially protected IP works even where there is no pos-
sible cause of action. For example, one leading E & O broker, Dennis Reiff, explains 
that he would require clearance from Disney before showing the Disney Concert Hall 
in the background of a commercial set in Los Angeles. Id. at 5–6. This conclusion is 
especially troubling since Disney does not own the venue but simply donated money 
toward its construction. More importantly, regardless of whether Disney had an own-
ership interest, permission for displaying the building is not required by copyright or 
trademark law. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(5), 113(c) (2000); Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & 
Museum v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755–56 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding photogra-
pher’s use of picture of Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and use of that name in conjunc-
tion with the photograph did not constitute trademark infringement). Nevertheless, 
cautious E & O brokers and attorneys clear such uses because Disney is known to be 
very litigious and has the money to make litigation very expensive. Heins & Beckles, 
supra note 30, at 6; see also Donaldson, supra note 34, at 214 (recommending clearing 
all distinctive locations and buildings); Gertz et al., supra note 34, at 43. 
44 Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Patent Review Might Help, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J., 943, 955–60 (2004); Mark Lemley 
& Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991, 1992–93 
(2007). 
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censing is not an option, either because it is cost-prohibitive or an 
IP owner doesn’t like the way its IP will be used, creators and in-
ventors must either alter their works or forgo some projects alto-
gether. The clearance culture and licensing practices are enforced 
extrajudicially by fear of litigation costs, in-house policies mandat-
ing clearance, concerns over forfeiting large investment or start-up 
costs, and by limits on funding, insurance, and distribution. The 
clearance culture therefore does not reflect any evaluation by IP 
users of their preferred allocation of IP rights. 
2. Formalized Trade Practices and Agreements 
More formal customary practices have also been used in an ef-
fort to avoid litigation. Unsurprisingly, many of these guidelines 
and agreements have developed in the context of copyright’s fair 
use doctrine. Many companies, industries, and trade groups have 
sought to insulate themselves from liability for copyright infringe-
ment by agreeing in a more formal manner to a set of standard 
copying practices.45 I will touch upon the most influential of these 
customary policies, guidelines, and “best practices” statements. 
a. The Gentleman’s Agreement 
One of the most well-known “agreements” in the copyright 
arena is the Gentleman’s Agreement of 1935 (“the Agreement”), 
which was negotiated between a committee from the Social Science 
Research Council (“SSRC”) and the National Association of Book 
Publishers. The Agreement was driven in large part by the advent 
of photocopying technology and uncertainty in the law that re-
sulted from the new ease with which works could be copied. Mem-
bers of the SSRC committee, led by Robert C. Binkley, worried 
that scholars and libraries might be viewed as infringing copyrights 
when making copies even though the purpose of such copying was 
purely for nonprofit research and personal use.46 Binkley concluded 
 
45 See, e.g., Robert S. Bray, Photocopying and Copyright: A Progress Report, 48 
Special Libr. 100, 101–03 (1957) (urging adoption of policy regarding library photo-
copying to avoid “unfavorable incident” in which publishers sue). 
46 See Robert C. Binkley, Manual on Methods of Reproducing Research Materials, 
at iii, 1–2 (1936); Jackson S. Saunders, Origin of the “Gentleman’s Agreement” of 
1935, in Reprography and Copyright Law app. B, at 159 (Lowell H. Hattery & 
George P. Bush eds., 1964). 
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that his ideal solution of a statutory exemption for research and 
scholarship was unlikely to pass in Congress and thought that liti-
gating such uses would be an unpredictable and expensive proposi-
tion.47 Accordingly, Binkley decided the best approach was to de-
velop an “understanding” with publishers that would insulate 
researchers and libraries from liability for copyright infringement.48 
The Gentleman’s Agreement was the result of Binkley’s com-
promise with publishers. The Agreement permitted libraries, ar-
chives, museums, and similar institutions to make single copies of 
works in their collections for scholars when scholars stated in writ-
ing that the use was solely for research purposes and to relieve the 
scholar of the burden of manual transcription.49 The Gentleman’s 
Agreement was not viewed by the parties as an enforceable con-
tract, but instead as an expression of the existing custom that per-
mitted limited copying for research purposes.50 
Some scholars have criticized the Agreement because it ex-
tended copyright law to the personal and private sphere, a proposi-
tion that they contend was previously an open question.51 The 
Agreement also took for granted that noncommercial, not-for-
profit uses could be copyright infringement. After the adoption of 
the Agreement, all uses that exceeded the stated limits in the 
Agreement “suddenly seemed suspect.”52 
The Gentleman’s Agreement has been highly influential. It has 
been adopted by the American Library Association (“ALA”) and 
was expressly incorporated into the ALA’s “Reproduction of Ma-
 
47 Peter B. Hirtle, Research, Libraries, and Fair Use: The Gentleman’s Agreement 
of 1935, 53 J. Copyright Soc’y 545, 564–69 (2006). 
48 Letter from Robert C. Binkley, Chairman, Joint Comm. on Materials for Re-
search, to W.W. Norton, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Book Publishers (May 25, 1935), 
reprinted in 2 J. Documentary Reprod. 29, 29–30 (1939); Saunders, supra note 46, at 
165–66. 
49 The Gentleman’s Agreement, reprinted in 2 J. Documentary Reprod., 29, 31–33 
(1939). 
50 Letter from Robert C. Binkley, supra note 48, at 29–30; Saunders, supra note 46, 
at 171. 
51 Hirtle, supra note 47, at 549, 567 (quoting a letter from Thomas P. Martin, Assis-
tant Chief of Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). Some scholars continue to 
contend that there should be no copyright infringement on the basis of personal uses 
of copyrighted works. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 
1871, 1918 (2007). 
52 Hirtle, supra note 47, at 549; see also discussion infra Section II.B. 
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terials Code” (“the Code”) in 1941.53 The ALA viewed the Gen-
tleman’s Agreement as defining “the practical and customary 
meaning” of fair use with regards to the reproduction of research 
materials.54 Accordingly, the Agreement, which very few parties 
had participated in developing, defined behavior among a much 
larger group. The ALA Code was even more limiting of scholars 
and copyright users than the Agreement—the Code expressly lim-
its copying of uncopyrighted works.55 The Code explains that copy-
ing such works would “deprive the publisher of income to which he 
appears to be entitled.”56 Such limits are not required or even sug-
gested by anything in copyright law or elsewhere. 
The Agreement and the Code have been almost universally 
adopted and are now followed by almost every library both for-
mally and as a matter of practice. Neither the Agreement nor the 
Code reflected researchers’, scholars’, or libraries’ views of what 
would be an appropriate rule for copying others’ works, but instead 
was primarily motivated by libraries’ concerns about how to best 
insulate themselves from potential legal liability and litigation ex-
penses. 
b. The Classroom Guidelines 
Perhaps the most influential IP guideline, which was itself influ-
enced by the Gentleman’s Agreement and related library codes, is 
the “Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-
Profit Educational Institutions,” commonly referred to as the 
“Classroom Guidelines.” While drafting the fair use section of the 
1976 Copyright Act,57 Congress recruited industry representa-
tives—in particular, publishers—to develop their own guidelines 
for what constituted fair use of writings and music in educational 
 
53 A.L.A. News, 35 A.L.A. Bull. 84, 84–85 (1941) (discussing contents of Reproduc-
tion of Materials Code); see also Abe A. Goldman, The Concept of the Law of Copy-
right, in Reprography and Copyright Law, supra note 46, at 15. 
54 Borge Varmer, Study No. 15: Photoduplication of Copyrighted Material by Li-
braries 52 (1959), reprinted in Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights, S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., Copyright Law Revision 45, 52 (Comm. Print 
1960) (quoting Reproduction of Materials Code) (emphasis added). 
55 A.L.A. News, supra note 53, at 84. 
56 Id. 
57 This section ultimately became 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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settings.58 The chairman and other members of the subcommittee 
working on the copyright revision “urged the parties to meet to-
gether independently in an effort to achieve a meeting of the minds 
as to permissible educational uses of copyrighted material.”59 Con-
gress contended that “workable voluntary arrangements” were the 
preferable solution to questions regarding the scope of fair use.60 
The Classroom Guidelines were developed and negotiated pri-
marily by large publishers and a few author organizations. Educa-
tors, universities, and scholars were only minimally represented in 
the negotiations, students were given no voice, and at least two ma-
jor university organizations, the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors and the American Association of Law Schools, ac-
tively opposed the Classroom Guidelines.61  
The Classroom Guidelines provide that single copies of the fol-
lowing items may be made for or by teachers for use in teaching or 
research: a chapter from a book; an article from a periodical or 
newspaper; a short story, short essay, or short poem; and a chart, 
graph, diagram, drawing, cartoon, or picture from a book, periodi-
cal, or newspaper.62 Multiple copies, not exceeding one copy per 
enrolled student, are permitted under limited circumstances where 
such uses are deemed to meet tests for brevity, spontaneity, and 
cumulative effect.63 Brevity is defined to limit copies to poems (or 
excerpts of poems) less than 250 words long and to limit prose ex-
cerpts to a range of 500 to 2500 words depending on the nature of 
 
58 The Author-Publisher Group, the Author’s League of America, the Association 
of American Publishers, Inc., and the Chairman of the Copyright Committee signed 
the resulting agreement on Classroom Guidelines with respect to books and periodi-
cals. Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83. 
59 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. 
60 H.R. Rep. No. 90-83, at 33, 36 (1967); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 67–68, as 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680. 
61 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 72, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5685. Although 
the letter to the Judiciary Committee transmitting the Classroom Guidelines suggests 
that some educators were involved in the umbrella ad hoc committee of educational 
institutions, no specific educator or university organization was a signatory to the 
agreement. See id. at 70; see also Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 
1522, 1535 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (referencing testimony of Professor Peter Jaszi that 
the Guidelines were forced on, rather than developed by, educators). 
62 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 68, as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5682. 
63 Id. 
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the work at issue.64 The extreme specificity of the Classroom 
Guidelines stands in stark contrast to the open-ended nature of the 
fair use criteria set forth in Section 107.65 
Although the Classroom Guidelines purport to set forth the 
“minimum” allowable uses, in practice, universities, libraries, and 
other educational institutions treat them as if they represent the 
maximum allowable uses.66 Many universities have handed out the 
Classroom Guidelines to their professors and mandated conformity 
with them.67 The Berkman Center for Internet & Society recently 
estimated that eighty percent of American universities comply with 
the Classroom Guidelines.68 This overwhelming level of compliance 
may have been driven by a lawsuit that a consortium of publishers 
filed against New York University (“NYU”) and individual profes-
 
64 Id. 
65 Even though Congress included the Guidelines in the legislative history, there was 
never a floor debate over the Guidelines, no vote on their provisions, and no oppor-
tunity for public comment. 
66 See, e.g., Nat’l Comm’n on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final 
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 52 
(1979), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/Chapter4.pdf [hereinafter 
CONTU Guidelines] (treating the Classroom Guidelines as part of the 1976 Copyright 
Act). Individual members of the Judiciary Committee and, in particular, its Chairman, 
Representative Kastenmeier, may have hoped that educators and universities would 
adhere to the Classroom Guidelines, but there is no evidence either that this was a 
generally held position by Congress, nor even that Kastenmeier thought that uses ex-
ceeding those allowable by the Classroom Guidelines should be per se infringing. 
67 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Dis-
putes 259 & n.73 (1991) (describing the Stanford University practice in the 1980s); 
Univ. of Cal., University of California Policy on the Reproduction of Copyrighted Mate-
rial for Teaching and Research (1986), http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/coordrev/policy/4-
29-86.html [hereinafter UC Policy]. Many universities will only defend professors 
against copyright infringement actions if they conform to the Guidelines or if they 
acted with the express approval of university counsel. See, e.g., N.Y. Univ., Univer-
sity Policy on Photocopying Copyrighted Materials 2 (1983), 
http://www.nyu.edu/students.guide/policies/photocopying.pdf [hereinafter NYU 
Policy]; Univ. of Va., The University’s Policy on Copying of Copyrighted Material 
(1987), http://www.lib.virginia.edu/reserve/copyright/infringe.html [hereinafter Vir-
ginia Policy]. Some universities go even further than the Guidelines and require that 
all material circulated in the classroom be accompanied by a notice of copyright or be 
purchased. See, e.g., Virginia Policy, supra. 
68 William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y, 
The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Mate-
rial in the Digital Age 57 (2006), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2006-09. Admit-
tedly, formal compliance with the Guidelines by universities likely exceeds actual 
compliance by individual university instructors. 
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sors in the early 1980s for copyright infringement arising out of the 
production of course readers for NYU’s classes. As part of the set-
tlement, NYU agreed to be bound by the Classroom Guidelines.69 
The Classroom Guidelines are not the only IP guidelines rou-
tinely followed. Similar Music Guidelines were developed to gov-
ern the use of musical works in classrooms.70 Many libraries also 
conform to the guidelines issued by the Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”) governing pho-
tocopying under interlibrary loan arrangements.71 These guidelines 
interpret Section 108(g)(2) of the Copyright Act, which allows li-
braries and archives to make copies “in such aggregate quanti-
ties . . . [that the copies do not] substitute for a subscription to or 
purchase of such work.”72 Like the Classroom Guidelines, the 
CONTU Guidelines are not law and provide specific limits on 
copying (allowing only five copies of each journal article per calen-
dar year)73 that may fall below the amount allowed under an inde-
pendent fair use analysis or under the express terms of Section 108. 
In the 1990s, Congress convened the Conference on Fair Use 
(“CONFU”) to develop fair use guidelines related to the use of 
digital images and other issues affected by new technology.74 Al-
though CONFU issued proposed guidelines, these guidelines never 
garnered consensus support by the conference participants and 
were never adopted by Congress.75 Nevertheless, the CONFU 
guidelines have been followed by a number of educational institu-
tions.76 All of these copyright guidelines have been developed to 
address legal uncertainty rather than to set forth IP owners’ or us-
ers’ preferred rules for the use of copyrighted works. 
 
69 Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-Civ-8333, 1983 WL 1134, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y., May 31, 1983). 
70 H.R. Rep. 94-1476, at 70–74 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5684–
88 (Guidelines for Educational Uses of Music). 
71 CONTU Guidelines, supra note 66, at 55. 
72 17 U.S.C. § 108(g)(2) (2000). 
73 CONTU Guidelines, supra note 66, at 55. 
74 Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Sec’y of Commerce & Comm’r of Patents & Trade-
marks, The Conference on Fair Use: Final Report to the Commissioner on the Con-
clusion of the Conference on Fair Use 7 (1998), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/confu/confurep.pdf. 
75 Id. at 18. 
76 Heins & Beckles, supra note 30, at 6. 
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c. In-House Guidelines 
The guidelines that I have discussed thus far have been formally 
negotiated and purport to cover uses of IP by multiple and some-
times adversarial parties. Many companies and organizations have 
also developed internal guidelines that govern the treatment of IP 
within their own institutions. In both the public and private sectors, 
guidelines have been developed to control internal copying and the 
use of others’ inventions, works, marks, and identities. 
The clearance practices that have been discussed are often spe-
cifically mandated by in-house guidelines. In the film and television 
industry, for example, networks, studios, and production compa-
nies develop “Standards and Practices” which control content, in-
cluding the use of copyrightable works, trademarks, names, and 
images.77 Most film studios require the clearance of all copyrighted 
works regardless of the manner in which they appear, the elimina-
tion of any references to trademarks in dialogue, the removal of or 
blurring of trademarks that appear on screen, and the clearance or 
removal of proper names.78 Many libraries also have developed in-
house guidelines to regulate photocopying, inter-library loans, and 
journal purchases.79 The primary purpose of these guidelines is to 
protect companies from being sued and if sued to insulate them 
from a finding of bad faith when the company and its employees 
have conformed to their internal guidelines.80 
d. Best Practices 
Another set of litigation-avoidance practices have recently been 
generated in the form of statements of “best practices.” Professors 
Patricia Aufderheide, Peter Jaszi, Julie Cohen, William Fisher, 
 
77 See, e.g., Testimony of Robert Eaton, Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. 
CBS, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (No. 78-Civ. 2417), reprinted in Excerpts 
of Record at 696–97, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d. Cir. 1981) (Nos. 81-7027, 81-7109); see also 
George Dessart, Museum of Broad. Commc’ns, Standards and Practices 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/S/htmlS/standardsand/standardsand.htm (last vis-
ited Aug. 24, 2007); Email from Gregg Nations, supra note 37. 
78 See discussion supra Subsection I.A.1; see also Heins & Beckles, supra note 30, at 
20–21. 
79 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1373–74 (Ct. Cl. 
1973); see also American Association of Law Libraries, Model Law Firm Copyright 
Policy (2007), http://www.aallnet.org/about/model_law.asp. 
80 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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William McGeveran, and others have recommended the develop-
ment of “best practices”81 to help educate gatekeepers and users of 
copyrighted works about the fair use doctrine and to define its 
scope.82 Although these best practices statements suggest that they 
present the “best” possible practices for the use of others’ IP, the 
statements do not purport to set forth the ideal or even a prefer-
able set of rules to govern fair uses. Instead, the statements try to 
use industry-established guidelines to establish what are “reason-
able” uses of others’ IP in the hopes that these industry statements 
will be adopted by courts when evaluating fair use defenses.83 
The Documentary Filmmakers’ Statement of Best Practices in 
Fair Use (the “Filmmakers’ Statement”), for example, describes its 
purpose as to “make[] clear what documentary filmmakers cur-
rently regard as [a] reasonable application of the copyright ‘fair 
use’ doctrine.”84 The Filmmakers’ Statement contends that “[f]air 
use is shaped, in part, by the practice of the professional communi-
ties that employ it.”85 The Filmmakers’ Statement sets forth limits 
on permitted and unpermitted uses of others’ IP within the context 
of documentary filmmaking. 
 
81 The term “best practices” is imported from the corporate world where it is used as 
a way for businesses to improve their performance by comparing their practices to 
what other companies are doing that has worked well. David Zaring, Best Practices, 
81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 294, 308 (2006). It has a very different meaning, as I explain, in the 
IP context. 
82 See Pat Aufderheide, How Documentary Filmmakers Overcame Their Fear of 
Quoting and Learned to Employ Fair Use: A Tale of Scholarship in Action, 1 Int’l J. 
Comm. 26, 33–35 (heralding the success of the Filmmakers’ Statement and calling for 
the adoption of similar best practices statements in other fields); Aufderheide & Jaszi, 
supra note 30, at 30–31; Fisher & McGeveran, supra note 68, at 91, 103–05; see also 
Kristin Thompson, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Society for Cinema Stud-
ies, “Fair Usage Publication of Film Stills,” 32 Cinema J. 3, 4, 12–14 (1993); Electronic 
Reserves and Fair Use, Ass’n Res. Libr. Bimonthly Report, Feb. 2004, at 1–3, avail-
able at http://www.arl.org/bm~doc/ereserves.pdf. 
83 See, e.g., Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 19, at 1. 
84 Id. (emphasis added). The Filmmakers’ Statement was produced by the Associa-
tion of Independent Video and Filmmakers, Independent Feature Project, Interna-
tional Documentary Association, National Alliance for Media Arts and Culture and 
the D.C. Chapter of Women in Film, in consultation with the Center for Social Media 
and the IP program at American University. The Statement was also endorsed by 
Arts Engine, the Bay Area Video Coalition, the Independent Television Service, 
P.O.V./American Documentary, and the University Film and Video Association. Id. 
85 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Another best practices statement was put forth by the Associa-
tion of Research Libraries (“ARL”) in its Circular 232. Circular 
232 establishes a statement of best practices based on current li-
brary practice with regards to material on electronic reserve for 
courses offered at educational institutions.86 The ARL admits that 
simply setting forth its own practices may not insulate it from copy-
right infringement, but states that by doing so it hopes (1) to en-
courage other libraries to follow the same practice, making a find-
ing of fair use more likely and (2) to establish that they have acted 
in “good faith” and therefore cannot be liable for additional dam-
ages if proven wrong in court. Once again these best practices 
statements are driven by an interest in avoiding litigation and do 
not reflect the drafters’ or constituents’ preferred set of rules for 
using another’s IP.87 
B. Normative and Aspirational Customs 
Thus far, I have identified customs that have developed with 
knowledge and awareness of, and often in reaction to, the existing 
legal regime. The producers of these practices are generally law-
savvy and the customary practices have developed as a way to cope 
with uncertain law or as a result of calculations about litigation 
costs. But customary practices and norms governing IP also have 
developed in circumstances where parties either think that formal 
IP law has little or no role, or where legal enforcement of existing 
IP laws is expressly disfavored by the community. In such commu-
nities, the practices and norms that develop often reflect commu-
nity members’ preferred distribution of rights in intangible goods. 
1. Chefs and Cyberspace 
Several recent scholarly works have analyzed communities in 
which traditional IP law does not function well but creative works 
continue to be produced.88 Even though most of this literature fo-
 
86 Electronic Reserves and Fair Use, supra note 82, at 1–3. 
87 Id. 
88 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation 
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1687 (2006) (discussing 
the continued productivity and creativity in the fashion industry despite the absence 
of IP protections). 
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cuses on critiquing the incentive rationale for protecting IP, these 
works also illuminate the ways in which communities can erect cus-
tomary protections for creative and inventive works outside the ju-
dicial system and enforce them using community norms. 
Recent work by economists Emmanuelle Fauchart and Eric von 
Hippel documents norms that have developed to protect recipes by 
French chefs in the absence of effective formal IP law.89 Fauchart 
and von Hippel found that even when legal action was possible, 
chefs preferred to follow the norms of the community. The key 
identified norms were: (1) chefs must not copy recipes either in 
print or in the restaurant kitchen without permission; (2) chefs 
cannot pass along recipes when they are revealed by a colleague 
without permission; and (3) chefs must attribute all recipes and in-
novations to their source.90 Enforcement of these norms is con-
ducted through shaming and ostracizing the offenders.91 
Social norms governing the use of IP have also developed in the 
context of cyberspace.92 The Internet has been viewed by some as a 
contemporary wild west in which laws are difficult to enforce. In 
such circumstances, community norms and practices are likely to 
fill the legal vacuum.93 In the world of online fan fiction, for exam-
ple, social norms demand that attribution be given when material is 
borrowed from another fan’s website.94 Copyright laws have little 
 
89 Emmanuelle Fauchart & Eric Von Hippel, Norms-Based Intellectual Property 
Systems: The Case of French Chefs, Org. Sci. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=881781). 
90 Id. at 3–4, 17. 
91 Id. at 18. 
92 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcul-
tural Creativity, 70 Law & Contemp. Probs. 135 (2007) (discussing the emerging 
community of online artists who create derivative pieces using established works and 
their subsequent attempts to legitimize and protect these unauthorized works); Mark 
A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1257 
(1998) (considering skeptically the value of allowing private norms rather than public 
law to order the Internet). 
93 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Not So Wild, Wild West 108–09 
(2004). 
94 Tushnet, supra note 92, at 155–56. Fan fiction creates storylines based on existing, 
generally popular works. Examples include Star Trek derivatives fantasizing about 
Kirk and Spock having a homosexual relationship and Harry Potter variations in 
which Hermione Granger plays the lead character. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi 
Sunder, Everyone’s A Superhero: A Cultural Theory of “Mary Sue” Fan Fiction as 
Fair Use, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 597 (2007). 
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sway over fans, who frequently infringe the copyrights of both 
original works and fellow fan creations. Fans instead conform to 
their own social norms dictating that the sites be nonprofit, add 
creative material to the original works, and provide appropriate 
credit.95 Deviation from the fan fiction norms may lead to shaming 
within that subculture, which is generally enough of a deterrent to 
keep the norms intact.96 Many of the norms that have developed in 
the IP context require attribution when the IP or quasi IP of an-
other is used. This attribution norm stands in stark contrast to the 
governing legal regimes which do not generally require, and cer-
tainly do not highlight, acknowledgement of sources or influences. 
2. University IP Ownership Policies 
Most, though not all, universities have adopted explicit policies 
vesting ownership of copyrighted works in the faculty; those which 
have not have generally conformed to a long-standing custom of 
allowing faculty to retain copyright ownership over their scholar-
ship and course materials.97 These formal and informal practices 
are primarily driven by a belief that it is proper as a normative mat-
ter for scholars to retain control over their work. These policies 
and practices, however, do not generally meet the requirements of 
Section 201 of the Copyright Act, which requires that any excep-
tion from the work-for-hire rules be set forth in a writing signed by 
both parties.98 
 
95 Tushnet, supra note 92, at 142–43, 155–56. 
96 Id. at 155. 
97 See, e.g., Harvard Univ., Statement of Policy in Regard to Inventions, Patents, 
and Copyrights (1998), http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~research/greybook/patents.html 
[hereinafter Harvard Invention Policy]; N.Y. Univ., Statement of Policy on Copyrights 
(1972), http://www.nyu.edu/oaa/policies.html; Univ. of Cal., University of California Policy 
on Copyright Ownership (1992), http://www.ucop.edu/ucophome/coordrev/policy/8-19-
92att.html [hereinafter UC Ownership Policy]; Univ. of Va., Policy: Copyright Policy 
(2004), https://etg07.itc.virginia.edu/policy/policydisplay?id=‘RES-001‘. 
98 The work-for-hire doctrine vests ownership of works of authorship in an employer 
rather than an employee when the work is produced in the scope of employment and 
at the direction of the employer. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2000); Cmty. for Creative 
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750–51 (1989). There is little dispute that univer-
sity faculty members who produce scholarly books and articles are fulfilling expected 
job tasks, but one could argue that the works are not prepared “at the direction” of 
the employer and therefore do not fall within the work-for-hire doctrine. 
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The academic copyright regime is often justified in university 
policy statements by reference to “established academic tradi-
tions.”99 In part because of the reliance on customary practices re-
garding copyright ownership, some universities treat computer 
software copyrights differently than other scholarly works.100 
NYU’s Computer Software Policy, for example, defers to “prac-
tices within the discipline,” as well as to the practices and views of 
individual schools and their deans to determine ownership of com-
puter software.101 
In contrast to the treatment of copyrightable works, most uni-
versities have adopted policies that assert ownership over all inven-
tions produced by faculty within the scope of employment, even 
though patent law vests ownership of inventions in the hands of in-
ventors, not employers.102 Thus, university practices with regard to 
IP ownership substantially differ from the default legal regimes. In-
stead, these practices reflect a normative evaluation by university 
communities of what they view as the preferable rules for deter-
mining IP ownership—one in which copyrightable works, but not 
 
99 N.Y. Univ., Statement of Policy on Computer Software Copyrights (1989), 
http://www.nyu.edu/oaa/policies.html [hereinafter NYU Software Copyright Policy] 
(emphasis added); see also UC Ownership Policy, supra note 97 (stating that the pol-
icy “is intended to embody the spirit of academic tradition, which provides copyright 
ownership to faculty for their scholarly and aesthetic copyrighted works” (emphasis 
added)); Univ. of Chi., New Information Technologies and Intellectual Property at the 
University (1999), http://www.uchicago.edu/docs/policies/provostoffice/intprop.html (“By 
long-established practice, individual faculty members enjoy the royalties on any book 
that they write . . . .” (emphasis added)); Yale Univ., Yale University Copyright Policy 
(2001), http://www.yale.edu/ocr/pfg/policies/copyright.html (“It is traditional at Yale 
and other universities . . . for books, articles and other scholarly writings by a faculty 
member to be deemed the property of the writer . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
100 See, e.g., NYU Software Copyright Policy, supra note 99. 
101 Id. (emphasis added). 
102 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115, 116 (2000); see, e.g., N.Y. Univ., Statement of Policy 
on Patents (1983), http://www.nyu.edu/oaa/policies.html#patents; Univ. of Cal., 
University of California Patent Policy (1997), 
http://www.ucop.edu/ott/genresources/policy_pdf/PatentPolicy1997.PDF; Univ. 
of Chi., Statute 18: Patent Policy, 44–45 (2007), 
http://trustees.uchicago.edu/articles/statutes.pdf. But see Harvard Invention Pol-
icy, supra note 97 (permitting faculty to retain patent ownership over nonmedical 
inventions). The treatment of patentable inventions has changed somewhat over 
time and university ownership of inventions funded by the federal government is 
now established under the Patent Act. Bayh-Dole University and Small Business 
Patent Procedures Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–201). 
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patents, should be owned by the individual faculty members who 
created them. 
3. Alternative IP Regimes and Open-Access Norms 
The Creative Commons and open-source and free software 
movements are prime examples of norm-driven alternative visions 
of IP law. These alternative regimes build upon existing IP frame-
works, altering the traditional boundaries of IP, and opting out of 
some established IP rights. Both movements combine norms and 
more formal practices to establish alternative IP frameworks that 
they view as preferable to the current IP regimes. 
The open-source and free software movements seek to ensure 
that computer source code is available and software is free to be 
copied, modified, and altered. The “free software” movement be-
gan in the early 1980s, spearheaded by Richard Stallman, who 
founded the Free Software Foundation. The Free Software Foun-
dation’s goal was to “preserve, protect and promote the freedom to 
use, study, copy, modify, and redistribute computer software.”103 To 
facilitate this goal, the foundation developed a GNU104 general 
public license (“GPL”). At its inception, the movement’s founders 
had a high-minded ethical purpose: “the GNU General Public Li-
cense is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change 
all versions of a program—to make sure it remains free software 
for all its users.”105 By free software, the Free Software Foundation 
meant free of restrictions, not necessarily free of charge.106 
As the movement progressed, an alternative branch developed 
which sought to attract businesses into the open software move-
ment; it renamed itself the open-source software (“OSS”) move-
ment. The OSS movement expanded exponentially under the ar-
gument that the most economically efficient way to develop good 
software was to have open source code that others could build 
upon. The OSS movement covers not only copyrights, but patents 
as well. While under the OSS rubric a software inventor can still 
 
103 See GNU Project Homepage, http://www.gnu.org (last visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
104 GNU is short for a UNIX-compatible software system that is “not UNIX.” Id. 
105 GNU General Public License, ver. 3 (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt.  
106 The Free Software Foundation’s motto begins, “‘[f]ree software[]’ is a matter of 
liberty, not price. [Y]ou should think of ‘free’ as in ‘free speech’ . . . .” GNU Project 
Homepage, supra note 103. 
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obtain a patent, patented software must be licensed for all to use 
under the terms of the GNU GPL. 
There is a social compact contained in both the GPL and OSS li-
censes which is a simple variation on the golden rule—you must 
distribute works with the same rights that you received. Enforce-
ment is driven by community shaming, rewards for conformity, le-
gal enforcement of licensing agreements, and market forces that 
promote open-source code as an optimal programming strategy.107 
Like the OSS movement, the Creative Commons movement, 
which developed at the beginning of 2001, layers on top of existing 
copyright law an alternative, formalized licensing regime that gives 
greater freedom of use than the default copyright regime permits.108 
The Creative Commons’s motto is “some rights reserved,” as op-
posed to traditional copyright law’s “all rights reserved.”109 
Creative Commons Public Licenses (“CCPLs”) allow an author 
or copyright holder to select various types of licenses. The vast ma-
jority of licensors require attribution for any copying but permit 
the preparation of noncommercial derivative works in a “share-
alike” manner (that is, users must use the same licensing scheme 
 
107 See, e.g., History of the Open Source Initiative, http://opensource.org/history (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2007); Open Source Case for Business: Advocacy, 
http://opensource.org/advocacy/case_for_business.php (last visited Aug. 29, 2007) (de-
scribing open-source mission as using market forces to encourage development of 
OSS); Bruce Perens, The Open Source Definition, in Open Sources: Voices from the 
Open Source Revolution 171, 172–173, 186–88 (Chris DiBona et al. eds., 1999) (trac-
ing the community-based history of the OSS and free software movements and its 
community-based future); Richard Stallman, The GNU Operating System and the 
Free Software Movement, in Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolu-
tion, supra, at 53, 55, 66–70 (describing free software movement as “a stark moral 
choice” and the importance of establishing community norms “buil[ding] up a strong 
feeling that free software is a matter of principle, and non-free drivers are intoler-
able”).  
108 See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2007). 
There have been a number of smaller scale efforts to provide alternative visions of 
copyright law. The American Library Association as early as the 1970s started dis-
tributing journals with notices that the journals could “be photocopied for the non-
commercial purpose of scientific or educational advancement” without permission. 
CONTU Guidelines, supra note 66, at 51. 
109 Creative Commons, supra note 108. Creative Commons enables individuals to 
dedicate their work to the public domain by offering “no rights reserved” licenses. 
Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, http://wiki.creativecommons.org/faq 
(last visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
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for the adapted work).110 The Creative Commons project has been 
extremely popular. By 2005, more than ten million CCPLs had 
been issued, and, today, major musicians, such as Pearl Jam and 
David Byrne, use the licenses for their own works.111 
Apart from any legal enforcement, there is strong pressure in 
certain communities to adopt CCPLs as opposed to the more re-
strictive traditional copyright regime. Numerous academics, espe-
cially IP law faculty, view the use of a Creative Commons license as 
a badge of honor, and the use of a traditional copyright as suspect. 
Ultimately, the Creative Commons is more of a social movement 
than an alternative IP regime. The founders of the project and the 
website refer to the movement as seeking to create an “environ-
mentalism for culture” or “ecology for creativity.”112 Professor 
Lawrence Lessig in his book Free Culture and in his writings about 
the Creative Commons project emphasizes the importance of de-
veloping through voluntary “practice” a “free culture” as opposed 
to a permission (or clearance) culture.113 Lessig and others strive to 
use custom and social norms to develop a free culture layered on 
top of existing IP laws. 
Such alternative IP frameworks are likely to continue to expand 
in the future. As an adjunct to the Creative Commons, a new pro-
ject, the Science Commons, has developed as a way of making pat-
ented works more easily usable by researchers.114 The success of 
these alternative IP regimes will turn in part on the treatment of 
customary practices by the courts, a subject I turn to next. 
II. THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOM INTO IP LAW 
In Part I, I described the most significant ways in which custom-
ary practices, agreements, guidelines, and norms control the de 
 
110 Brief for Creative Commons as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, 
Metro-Goldwin Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480). 
111 Id. at 2; Pearl Jam Releases Its First Music Video in Eight Years Under a Crea-
tive Commons License, Creative Commons Press Release (May 19, 2006), 
http://creativecommons.org/press-releases/entry/5912. 
112 Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2004); Crea-
tive Commons Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 109. 
113 Lessig, Free Culture, supra note 30 (emphasis added); see also James Boyle, Sha-
mans, Software, and Spleens, at x (1996); Lessig, supra note 112, at 12–13. 
114 See Science Commons: Biological Materials Transfer Project, 
http://sciencecommons.org/projects/licensing/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
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facto scope of IP rights. These customary practices have also al-
tered de jure IP rights by influencing court decisions and legisla-
tion. In almost every instance in which courts have considered cus-
tom in IP cases, they have pointed to nonconformity with industry 
practices as a basis to reject defenses to infringement or a basis for 
finding infringement itself. Only rarely have courts referred to con-
formity with industry practices as a possible basis for a defense. 
In this Part, I present a systematic analysis of the ways courts in-
corporate custom in IP cases. When courts incorporate custom, ei-
ther implicitly or explicitly, they often use customary practices as 
proxies for other considerations, such as what constitutes a “rea-
sonable” or “ethical” use of another’s IP or what will be the mar-
ket impact of allowing such uses. I begin here a critique of the in-
corporation of custom for such second-order questions—a critique 
that I will further develop in Parts III and IV. At the same time, I 
observe some less problematic uses of custom, such as when courts 
look at custom as evidence of what is generally done in an industry 
to assist with interpreting IP contracts or patent claims. 
A. Custom as Evidence of Market Effects, Commerciality, and 
Damages 
Courts often consider what is customarily done as evidence of 
whether there is a negative market effect from an unconsented use 
of another’s IP. The most prominent example of the use of custom 
to evaluate market effects is when courts look at “customary pric-
ing” and evidence of licensing practices under the rubric of copy-
right’s fair use defense. Two of the four statutory factors for de-
termining fair use in copyright cases involve consideration of the 
market for a copyrighted work.115 One factor, the first enumerated 
in Section 107 of the Copyright Act, looks at the character of the 
use and in particular whether the use is commercial.116 A nonprofit 
or noncommercial use weighs in favor of a finding of fair use, while 
a commercial use weighs against such a finding. The fourth enu-
merated factor also considers the market by asking courts to con-
 
115 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
116 This factor, as interpreted by the courts, also requires a consideration of whether 
the use is transformative. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–
79 (1994). 
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sider whether the relevant use will negatively affect the market for 
the copyrighted work. Under this rubric, clearance culture prac-
tices have an enormous impact on what courts consider allowable 
uses of others’ IP because courts view both existing and potential 
licensing markets as an indication of whether a use is for profit and 
also whether a given use is likely to harm the market for the work 
at issue.117 
The frequent incorporation of custom into copyright’s statutory 
fair use analysis, and, in particular, its use as a proxy for market ef-
fects and the commercial or noncommercial character of a use, 
stems in large part from the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.118 In Harper & Row, 
the Court looked at customary practices to determine whether a 
use was commercial or noncommercial as part of its fair use deter-
mination: “[t]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not 
whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but whether 
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted mate-
rial without paying the customary price.”119 When a defendant is 
found to have not paid the “customary price,” the defendant’s use 
is often judged “unfair.”120 
 
117 See, e.g., Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166–68, 176 (2d Cir. 2001); L.A. News 
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 994–95 (9th Cir. 1998); L.A. News Serv. 
v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (9th Cir. 1997); Ringgold v. Black 
Entm’t Television, 126 F.3d 70, 80–81 (2d Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. 
Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385–86 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 926–27 (2d Cir. 1994); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 311–12 
(2d Cir. 1992); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1048–49 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Frank Schaffer Publ’ns v. The Lyons P’ship, 10 Ent. L. Rep. 9 (C.D. 
Cal. 1993); Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1532 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991). 
118 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
119 Id. at 562. 
120 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801–02, 804 & 
n.19 (6th Cir. 2005) (questioning the availability of a fair use defense for the unli-
censed sampling of another’s song in an industry where most companies and artists 
“sought licenses as a matter of course”); Davis, 246 F.3d at 176 (rejecting fair use de-
fense for incidental display of sunglasses in advertisement when defendant had failed 
to pay the customary price for use of a copyrighted design); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 
(rejecting fair use defense where defendant did not follow industry custom of clearing 
background scenery used in television show); Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1386–
88 (rejecting fair use defense when defendant did not follow industry custom of licens-
ing coursepack materials); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930–31 (rejecting fair 
use defense when private corporation did not follow industry practice of licensing 
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The “customary price” analysis, although ostensibly a factor-one 
inquiry, more neatly fits into the logic of factor four. When there is 
a customary price for licensing a copyrighted work, courts often 
find that failure to pay that price amounts to market harm.121 The 
problem with this analysis is that given the clearance culture, li-
censing is the dominant practice. Accordingly, IP owners can al-
most always make the case for lost licensing fees as a likely market 
harm, making the fair use defense meaningless. The fact that li-
censing may be common should not be used to determine that a 
use is for profit; under such a “customary price” analysis, even 
“educational” uses could be viewed by courts as commercial.122 
Several scholars and a few courts have criticized the reliance on 
licensing evidence and have warned of the circularity dangers in-
herent in considering licensing opportunities as a basis for market 
harm.123 The circularity concern arises because the existence of a li-
censing market for a work depends entirely on a court determina-
tion of whether a given use is fair or not. If a use is fair, there will 
be no licensing market, and if a use is not fair, a licensing market 
 
journal articles used by its researchers); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel 
Enters., 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 47–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting fair use defense when de-
fendants failed to license footage used in a promotional clip in contravention of the 
industry practice to license such clips); Richard Feiner & Co. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 
No. 97-Civ-9144, 1998 WL 437157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding defendants’ failure 
to license film trailers reckless because “defendants are not amateurs in video produc-
tion” and it is film “industry practice to license trailers for exhibition”); cf. Triangle 
Publ’ns v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, 626 F.2d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that the use of plaintiff’s copyrighted magazine cover was fair use, in part because the 
advertising industry routinely follows a practice of using copyrighted works in com-
parative ads); Frank Schaffer Publ’ns, 10 Ent. L. Rep. at 13 (holding that use was fair 
where no license was sought, in part because the “customary price for the inclusion of 
[the plaintiff’s posters in the defendant’s show’s set] is gratis”). 
121 See supra note 120. 
122 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000) (listing an “educational” use as one that is nonprofit). 
123 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1397 (Merritt, J., dissenting); id. at 
1400–04, 1407–10 (Ryan, J., dissenting); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 929 n.17, 
931; id. at 936–39 (Jacobs, J., dissenting); Hofheinz v. A&E Television Networks, 146 
F. Supp. 2d 442, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Hofheinz v. AMC Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d 127, 
140–41 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intel-
lectual Property Law, 116 Yale L.J. 882, 895–98 (2007); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefin-
ing the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Sys-
tems, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 38–41 (1997); Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of 
Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the 
Courts, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1145, 1160–62, 1164 (2000); cf. Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Sad-
erup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 n.10 (Cal. 2001). 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
1934 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 93:1899 
will develop. By looking to licensing markets, judges are abdicating 
their role as independent evaluators of what uses are fair. More-
over, one cannot truly say that a licensing market reflects an opti-
mal market allocation of rights because the market itself is de-
pendent on courts’ assessments of what constitutes fair use.124 
Despite such concerns, courts continue to rely on evidence of li-
censing practices as a basis for rejecting fair use and other de-
fenses. In Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, for example, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected a fair use 
defense when a television sitcom used the plaintiff’s artwork in the 
background of a set without permission.125 The court pointed to the 
custom in the TV and film industries of licensing copyrighted 
works used as set-dressing.126 If not for the consideration of indus-
try clearance practices,  Black Entertainment Television (“BET”) 
had a very strong fair use defense—the poster containing the plain-
tiff’s artwork was visible for less than thirty seconds, was never the 
focal point of any shot, was not referred to in the dialogue, and was 
lawfully purchased.127 The Ringgold court concluded, however, that 
BET had failed to pay the “customary price” for using Ringgold’s 
work by not licensing her art and therefore could not avail itself of 
the fair use defense.128 
 
124 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
125 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81. 
126 The court cited an amicus brief filed by the Artists Rights Society and the Picasso 
Administration that listed numerous examples of other shows and films that had li-
censed artwork in similar circumstances. Id. at 81 n.15; see also Brief for the Artists 
Rights Society, Inc. and the Picasso Administration as Amici Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents at 4, Ringgold, 126 F.3d 70 (No. 96-9329). But see Sandoval v. New Line 
Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217–18 (2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting similar claim on the basis 
that use of copyrighted photographs by artist was de minimis without considering the 
licensing market). 
127 The district court in Ringgold had held the use fair when it did not consider such 
industry licensing practices. Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1299 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); see also Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding unlicensed use of plaintiff’s mobile in a film fair even 
though it was sometimes shown in close-up and appeared on screen for over one and 
a half minutes); cf. Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 215 (holding use of plaintiff’s photographs in 
the motion picture Seven noninfringing and de minimis because photographs were 
visible for less than thirty-six seconds and were not the focal point of any shot). 
128 Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 81 (quoting Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
562 (1985)) (emphasis omitted). 
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Courts have also relied on industry licensing practices to evalu-
ate the legitimacy of photocopying materials for educational and 
research purposes. In Princeton University Press v. Michigan 
Document Services, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, rejected the 
fair use defense of a photocopying service that prepared course 
packets for a university, in large part because the defendant did not 
follow the industry practice of licensing the copyrighted works used 
in such packets.129 Similarly, in American Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco, the Second Circuit rejected Texaco’s fair use defense 
largely because of noncompliance with industry custom.130 The 
court was substantially persuaded that the copying of journal arti-
cles by Texaco’s research scientists was unfair because many major 
corporations got licenses for similar copying. The Court noted that 
Texaco itself had even paid for such licenses in the past.131 Again, 
both courts rejected fair use defenses because nonconformity with 
industry practices convinced the courts that the uses were commer-
cial and that they caused market harm. 
The use of custom as an indicator of market effects and com-
merciality is not limited to copyright’s fair use analysis. Custom 
also comes into play in right of publicity cases.132 In particular, 
courts consider customary practices when evaluating First 
Amendment defenses to publicity violations. This is true in part 
because some courts have looked to copyright’s fair use analysis as 
 
129 99 F.3d 1381, 1385–88 (6th Cir. 1996). 
130 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994). 
131 Id. at 930. 
132 I note that the existence of the right of publicity itself is in large part a result of 
the incorporation of custom. When courts first chose to adopt this quasi-property 
right, they pointed to the fact that the private sector was already licensing the use of 
celebrities’ names and images, and that courts should help to enforce these industry 
practices. See, e.g., Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953) (noting that one justification for the court’s creation of a right of publicity was 
that celebrities, such as athletes and actors, “would feel sorely deprived if they no 
longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their counte-
nances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways”); see also 
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 125, 174 (1993) (suggesting that the adoption of a right of pub-
licity by the courts was an effort to “[give] legal form (and protection) to a preexisting 
commercial practice”). 
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a useful guide for evaluating First Amendment defenses to right of 
publicity claims.133 
Separate from the importation of copyright’s fair use analysis, 
there is also a long-standing precedent in right of publicity cases for 
considering custom when analyzing First Amendment defenses. 
The Supreme Court in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting134 
used language very similar to the “customary price” language from 
Harper & Row to reject a First Amendment defense to a right of 
publicity violation stemming from the unlicensed broadcast on the 
nightly news of the plaintiff’s human cannonball act. The Court de-
clared that “[n]o social purpose is served by having the defendant 
get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value 
and for which he would normally pay.”135 The references in Zac-
chini to the market value and what is “normally” paid expressly tie 
the First Amendment defense in right of publicity cases to custom. 
If an industry “normally” licenses a use, then a defendant will have 
difficulty establishing a First Amendment defense.136 Accordingly, 
because industry practice is to clear almost all references to proper 
names and in particular references to public figures, courts will in-
creasingly favor publicity holders when defendants fail to license 
such uses. 
Courts also look at evidence of customary licensing fees to 
award damages and reasonable royalties in IP cases.137 When courts 
 
133 See, e.g., Comedy III Prods. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807–08 (Cal. 
2001); see also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47 cmt. d (1993). 
134 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
135 Id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren & 
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 331 (1966)) (emphasis added). 
136 See, e.g., Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. 2003) (quoting “mar-
ket value” language from Zacchini in analysis rejecting First Amendment defense to 
use of athlete’s name in comic book series); Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 805 (quot-
ing “market value” and “normally pay” language in discussion of why First Amend-
ment did not protect use of celebrity images on t-shirts); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, 
332 F.3d 915, 955–56 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting) (quoting “market value” and 
“normally pay” language twice in his argument that the First Amendment should not 
have protected the unauthorized use of Tiger Woods’s image). 
137 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3) (2000); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 786 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming jury instructions that asked jury to 
consider past licensing fees in calculating damages); Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 
164–72 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing calculation of damages based on licensing market for 
similar works); Victor G. Reiling Assocs. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 175, 203 
(D. Conn. 2005) (allowing industry licensing practices to form a possible basis of rea-
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consider what a fair market value would have been for the use of a 
plaintiff’s identity, trademark, copyrighted work, or patent, they 
usually consider customary rates in the industry.138 If there is a 
strong licensing market, then a plaintiff will get a larger damages 
award.139 Thus, risk-averse behavior by potential defendants at the 
front end has a multiplying effect on the back end when a defen-
dant loses at trial. Courts generally do not consider whether a de-
fendant might have removed the reference or use rather than li-
censing it at the market rate. Moreover, as I discuss in more detail 
in Part III, custom is not a good indicator of how a market should 
best allocate IP rights and therefore should not generally be used 
to determine the size of a judgment.140 
B. Custom as a Proxy for What Should Be Done 
Courts have also looked at customary practices to make value 
judgments about a defendant’s behavior. One way of understand-
ing copyright’s and trademark’s fair use defenses is as a normative 
evaluation of whether a defendant’s actions were “fair” in the col-
loquial sense.141 Failing to conform with industry practices is gener-
ally viewed by courts as “unfair.” Courts have also looked at non-
 
sonable royalty recovery in misappropriation case); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. 
Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (setting forth widely adopted 
factors, including licensing fees on patent, used to calculate reasonable royalty); 7 
Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 20.03(2) (2007) (“A patent owner may re-
cover as a measure of damages the royalty rate established by prior actual licenses for 
acts comparable to those engaged in by the infringer without authority.”). 
138 See, e.g., Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52, 74 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Lemley & 
Shapiro, supra note 44, at 2017–25; see also supra note 137. 
139 See, e.g., McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d at 69–70 (allowing testimony regarding licensing 
by well-known athletes in order to calculate both damages and reasonable royalties in 
a right of publicity case); see also supra note 137. 
140 See discussion infra Section III.A. 
141 There are two fair use defenses in trademark law: a statutory defense and a com-
mon law defense. These defenses allow descriptive uses of others’ trademarks, as well 
as references to others’ trademarks in situations where a defendant needs to reference 
the trademark, does not use more of the mark than is necessary, and does not suggest 
sponsorship or affiliation. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000); New Kids on the Block v. 
News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992). I note that the Trademark Dilu-
tion Revision Act of 2006 explicitly refers to the common law doctrine of nominative 
fair use but does not define its scope or make clear whether it applies to infringement 
actions. See Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006) (codified as amended in vari-
ous sections of 15 U.S.C., but primarily in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). 
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conformity with industry custom as a basis to reject First Amend-
ment defenses on normative grounds. Because courts view noncon-
forming uses as “unethical,” courts have concluded that defendants 
do not deserve First Amendment protection. 
In Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., for ex-
ample, both the district court and the Second Circuit held that fail-
ing to license film clips when it was industry custom to do so was 
unethical and a basis for rejecting both fair use and First Amend-
ment defenses to copyright infringement.142 In Roy Export, CBS 
aired a retrospective on the great film actor and director Charlie 
Chaplin soon after his death. CBS incorporated footage from both 
Chaplin’s copyrighted and uncopyrighted films in its broadcast 
without licensing the footage. Roy Export held the copyrights to 
some of Chaplin’s films. CBS previously had asked Roy Export for 
licenses to use the film clips in a future obituary, but Roy Export 
rejected the request. A jury awarded more than $700,000 in dam-
ages to the plaintiff for copyright infringement.143 
After a series of post-trial motions, the district court in Roy Ex-
port upheld the jury verdict and rejected a fair use defense. The 
district court found highly persuasive the fact that “CBS’ conduct 
violated not only its own guidelines but also industry standards of 
ethical behavior.”144 The district court pointed to the industry’s li-
censing practices as evidence of harm to the potential market for 
the plaintiffs’ copyrighted works and of “bad faith.”145 Although the 
issue of fair use was not raised on appeal, the Second Circuit, in af-
firming the district court decision, pointed to CBS’s violation of its 
in-house guidelines and industry licensing practices as evidence of 
“commercial immorality” and a basis for rejecting its First 
Amendment defense against the unfair competition and copyright 
infringement claims.146 
The holding in Roy Export is not an isolated instance of courts 
treating failure to conform to custom as unethical and as a basis for 
rejecting fair use and First Amendment defenses. The Supreme 
 
142 672 F.2d 1095, 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1982); 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1146–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980).  
143 Id. at 1098. 
144 Roy Exp., 503 F. Supp. at 1146–47 (emphasis added). 
145 Id. at 1146–47 (emphasis added). 
146 Roy Exp., 672 F.2d at 1105 (emphasis added). 
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Court in Harper & Row cited Roy Export when it set forth its “cus-
tomary price” standard,147 suggesting that the customary price 
analysis is more an evaluation of what is “fair” in a colloquial sense 
than what is “fair” in a legal sense. The customary price language is 
more of a normative concept than an economic one; it suggests that 
if you are not paying what everyone else is to use an IP work, then 
your behavior is unethical and undeserving of protection from find-
ings of infringement. 
Courts have similarly rejected fair use defenses when defendants 
do not adhere to their own in-house guidelines. In Roy Export, the 
district court noted that CBS had a general policy of clearing clips 
that it used in its broadcasts.148 The court therefore concluded that 
CBS’s failure to clear the clips from Chaplin’s films before airing 
them in a television retrospective of Chaplin that aired the day af-
ter his death was presumptively unfair.149 Similarly, in American 
Geophysical Union, the court noted that Texaco had a policy of li-
censing material that it copied, and that its failure to conform with 
its own in-house guidelines weighed against a fair use defense.150 
Not only are findings of infringement more likely and defenses 
more likely to be rejected, but damages are often multiplied if a de-
fendant is found to have willfully or recklessly infringed another’s 
IP rights. Findings of willfulness or recklessness are often made 
when a defendant has not followed the customary practices of a 
particular industry,151 has sought and been denied a license,152 or has 
exceeded the procedures set forth in internal policies.153 Even when 
 
147 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
148 Roy Exp., 503 F. Supp. at 1146. 
149 Id. at 1147. The court so concluded even though CBS had asked numerous times 
for permission and been denied a license to use the clips. Id. at 1146. 
150 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1365–66 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Cowen, J., dissenting) (contending that 
libraries’ photocopying should have been held unfair because the libraries failed to 
conform to their in-house guidelines). 
151 See, e.g., Richard Feiner & Co. v. Passport Int’l Prod., No. 97-Civ-9144, 1998 WL 
437157, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding that defendant had acted willfully and reck-
lessly in copyright case because clips from film trailers had not been licensed, in con-
travention of industry custom). 
152 See, e.g., Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1545 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(finding intent to infringe trademark because defendant asked for and was denied li-
cense). 
153 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930–31; Roy Exp., 672 F.2d at 1105. 
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a defendant can establish that an IP owner would not have licensed 
the work at any fee, courts have viewed a showing of nonconform-
ity with custom as a basis to find bad faith154—a finding that gener-
ates higher statutory damages, punitive damages, and possible 
criminal liability. Conformity with custom, by contrast, often pro-
vides a basis for a finding of good faith even if infringement is ulti-
mately found.155 
The downside of using custom to determine what is “fair” is per-
haps most clear in the context of the Classroom Guidelines. Even 
though these guidelines are not legally binding156 and were intended 
to state a minimum floor of allowable uses, courts have routinely 
viewed copying exceeding the Classroom Guidelines as unfair and 
done in bad faith.157 In Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics, Kinko’s 
infringement was viewed as committed in bad faith partly because 
Kinko’s in-house handbook noted that its copying practices ex-
ceeded the standards of the Guidelines.158 Interestingly, there are 
no published cases in which a court has found a use that exceeded 
the scope of the Guidelines to be fair. The fact that these Guide-
lines and other trade “agreements” set a standard of “ethical be-
havior” in the minds of judges leads courts and fact finders to con-
clude that uses exceeding the standards are not fair, and that the 
resulting infringements were committed in bad faith.159 The end re-
 
154 See, e.g., Roy Exp., 672 F.2d at 1105. 
155 See, e.g., Moore v. Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 277 (5th Cir. 1987) (awarding no 
exemplary damages in right of publicity case where defendant adhered to industry 
practice). 
156 Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 70–71 
(1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5684 (noting that the Classroom 
Guidelines are not legally binding and are “not intended to limit the types of copying 
permitted under the standards of fair use under judicial decision”). 
157 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390–91 
(6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting fair use defense in part because preparation of course pack-
ets violated Classroom Guidelines); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 919 (rejecting 
a fair use defense when private sector copying exceeded that permitted by Classroom 
Guidelines); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting fair use 
defense in part because copying for class materials exceeded guidelines); Basic Books 
v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding prepara-
tion of course packets not a fair use in part because it violated the Guidelines’ prohi-
bition on anthologies). 
158 758 F. Supp. at 1544–45. 
159 A number of additional explanations for the limiting role of guidelines are possi-
ble. Courts may prefer the certainty of the Guidelines to less predictable, independ-
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
2007] The Questionable Use of Custom in IP 1941 
sult is that the negotiated guidelines—rather than independent fair 
use analysis—unnecessarily narrow fair use and control both the de 
facto and de jure scope of IP rights. 
C. Custom as a Proxy for What Is Reasonable 
Courts often look to customary practices to evaluate what rea-
sonable uses or behaviors are. Defenses to uses of others’ IP are 
generally rejected when deemed, either explicitly or implicitly, 
“unreasonable,” and courts frequently defer to customary practices 
to determine whether a use is reasonable.160 It is not easy to define 
what constitutes a reasonable use of another’s IP. A reasonable use 
is not the same as a just or moral use; instead, like the reasonable 
person standard in tort law, it asks more generally what is appro-
priate in a given circumstance, not what is optimal or ethical. Be-
cause it is difficult to determine when a use of another’s IP is rea-
sonable and there is little available guidance, courts often use 
custom as a shortcut or proxy for such determinations. 
Nowhere is this approach more evident than in copyright’s fair 
use doctrine. The traditional common law fair use standard in fact 
asked courts to evaluate whether a use was “reasonable and cus-
tomary.”161 Although this traditional formulation of fair use asks 
courts to consider both what is reasonable and what is customary, 
courts have generally conflated the two inquiries so that what is 
customary becomes what is reasonable. 
Accordingly, a number of courts have judged uses fair solely on 
the basis that such uses have customarily been practiced.162 This ap-
 
ent, or ad hoc determinations. Courts also may be treating the fair use inquiry as a 
form of a reasonable use inquiry, in which uses exceeding guidelines are viewed as 
unreasonable. I discuss this point in the next Section, II.C. 
160 I note that despite this tendency the scope of IP ownership and use rights do not 
expressly turn on whether uses are reasonable. Nevertheless, for purposes of this dis-
cussion, I assume reasonableness is a legitimate consideration and simply inquire 
whether courts’ use of custom as an indicator of reasonableness makes sense. 
161 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 
1934); see also Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (describing 
a fair use at common law as “predicated on the author’s implied consent to ‘reason-
able and customary’ use when he released his work for public consumption” (empha-
sis added)); Richard C. De Wolf, An Outline of Copyright Law 143 (1925). 
162 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 
1973) (suggesting that “years of accepted practice” can form a basis for establishing a 
fair use). The British defense of fair abridgement, which predates the American con-
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proach appears to turn on courts’ conclusions that uses that have 
long been allowed are reasonable ones.163 One primary example of 
this type of analysis is the courts’ general acceptance of the use of 
copyrighted works without permission in biographical works be-
cause such uses are “customary.”164 This example highlights one of 
the potential problems with using custom as a proxy for reason-
ableness—the ability to use copyrighted works may shift over time 
as customary practices shift. In fact, we can already see this hap-
pening in the context of biographies. As part of the ever-growing 
clearance culture, publishers routinely insist on clearing copy-
righted works that are used in biographies.165 If custom provides the 
only, or even simply the primary, basis for viewing such uses as 
reasonable, then this shifting custom is likely to result in new rules 
that prohibit rather than permit the use of others’ IP in biogra-
phies.166 Whereas if an independent fair use evaluation were con-
ducted, courts might well conclude that permitting such uses in bi-
ographies is reasonable and fair, regardless of whether it is 
customary. 
Another area, besides biographies, in which courts have relied 
on long-standing practices as a basis for fair use findings is in the 
 
cept of fair use, also historically considered adherence to “custom and usage” as evi-
dence of a fair abridgement. Customs and usages, however, were never conclusive of 
that inquiry. See, e.g., Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 270–71 (Ch.). 
163 Several scholars also have suggested that long-standing fair uses should be con-
sidered when evaluating whether a given use is fair, both because of their historical 
legacy and also because of a view that these customary practices reflect a normative 
evaluation of what is “fair” or “reasonable.” See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-
Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1525, 1628–29 (2004); 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 Legal Theory 
347, 371 (1997); Weinreb, supra note 28, at 1152–61; cf. Ann Bartow, Electrifying 
Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a Book, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 13, 17 
(2003) (suggesting that Congress adopt “consumer use norms” as part of copyright 
law to encourage compliance). As I discuss in Part IV, allowing uses based on cus-
tomary practices can be as problematic as barring uses on the basis of such practices. 
164 See, e.g., New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Carol Publ’g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 
1990); Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). 
165 See discussion supra Section I.A and note 32. 
166 This discussion raises the question of whether courts use custom to establish fixed 
rules or whether they instead look to custom more generally at a given moment in 
time, whatever that custom might be. This is a difficult question to answer given the 
general lack of awareness about the use of custom in IP cases, as well as the fact that 
when courts adopt a particular custom they often reinforce the existing practices. See 
discussion infra Part IV. 
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context of copyright’s work-for-hire doctrine. As discussed, many 
universities expressly allow faculty members to retain copyrights 
over their lectures, course materials, and scholarly works. Even 
though most of these university policies do not meet the statutory 
requirements set forth in Section 201,167 several courts have relied 
on the customary “faculty exception” to vest copyright ownership 
in faculty rather than universities.168 This conclusion treats the long-
standing nature of the exception as an indication of its reasonable-
ness. This approach is particularly troubling because these courts 
are directly contravening explicit statutory language on the basis of 
custom. 
Courts have also looked to customary practices as indicia of 
what uses reasonable authors would permit of their works. The Su-
preme Court adopted this view in dicta in Harper & Row.169 Apply-
ing this analysis in Harper & Row, the Court held that the publica-
tion of excerpts from a previously unpublished work was unfair and 
noted that a reasonable author would not customarily agree to al-
low the dissemination of his work in advance of his own publica-
tion.170 
Many courts have picked up the implied consent analysis from 
Harper & Row.171 There are two significant problems, however, 
with the Court’s suggested approach. First, fair use ceases to make 
 
167 See discussion supra Subsection I.B.2. 
168 See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am., 847 F.2d 412, 416–17 (7th Cir. 1988) (de-
scribing the “universal assumption and practice” that academic writing belongs to the 
faculty member and not to the university, and concluding that if forced to decide 
whether the 1976 Act abolished the teacher exception, the court would hold “that the 
exception had survived”); Weinstein v. Univ. of Ill., 811 F.2d 1091, 1094 (7th Cir. 
1987) (noting the “academic tradition” that professors own their scholarly writing); cf. 
Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 185–86 (2d Cir. 
2004) (suggesting that faculty exception after the 1976 revisions may be limited to cir-
cumstances in which university has written policy so indicating). But see Forasté v. 
Brown Univ., 290 F. Supp. 2d 234, 238–39 (D.R.I. 2003) (concluding that teacher ex-
ception did not survive 1976 revision); Pittsburg State Univ. v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 
122 P.3d 336, 345–47 (Kan. 2005) (same). 
169 471 U.S. at 550–51. 
170 Id. at 553. 
171 See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(referring to the Harper & Row dicta regarding author’s implied consent and one tra-
ditional understanding of fair use); Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. 
Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (invoking Harper & Row’s implied consent ap-
proach to the “reasonable and customary” use analysis, but finding inapplicable when 
a use is in a market that is not sought out by the copyright holder). 
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any sense if it turns on whether an author would consent to the use, 
since the guiding principle of fair use is to allow uses when there is 
no consent, implied or otherwise.172 
Second, and of more relevance to the discussion here, customary 
practices often indicate decisions by IP owners not to enforce their 
rights for pragmatic reasons, such as litigation costs, rather than 
suggest what uses a reasonable owner would consent to. For exam-
ple, prior to the advent of photocopying technology, publishers 
generally did not enforce copyright laws against scholars or others 
who copied material by hand from books and journals. This lack of 
enforcement was not driven by a view that such copying was rea-
sonable but instead reflected a lack of concern over such copying; 
once the same type of copying could be done faster and more eas-
ily using photocopying technology, publishers stepped in to enforce 
their rights. My point here is not to take sides about whether such 
copying is or is not fair, but instead to highlight that whether such 
uses are customary should not be the primary basis for determining 
whether the given copying is reasonable or fair. It may be that the 
change in the ease of copying alters an analysis of what uses are 
reasonable or appropriate, but one could also conclude that it is 
the purpose for which the copy is made that matters rather than 
the method of copying. In other words, one could conclude that 
single, personal copies for research are reasonable uses regardless 
of whether done by hand, by photocopier, or by scanner, and re-
gardless of what the common practices are. 
D. Custom as Evidence of What Is Generally Done 
Sometimes courts look at evidence of custom simply to deter-
mine what is generally done in a given industry without using cus-
tom for second-order evaluations of what is reasonable, ethical, or 
optimal. Such evidence may be highly relevant for particular in-
quiries in IP cases. For example, custom matters in trademark in-
 
172 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 
(2003), confirms this view. Eldred establishes that fair use is a built-in free speech 
guard that furthers First Amendment principles. Id. Accordingly, fair use cannot be 
based solely on authorial consent. Even if an author were likely to reject a particular 
use, such as the use of clips of Charlie Chaplin in an obituary (as in Roy Export) or 
the use of lyrics in a parody (as in Acuff-Rose), fair use should still be available as a 
defense to copyright infringement. 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
2007] The Questionable Use of Custom in IP 1945 
fringement and false endorsement cases, which turn on consumer 
confusion. In these instances, what is generally done will influence 
consumer perceptions of whether the uses of trademarks or celeb-
rity names were sponsored or endorsed by the given trademark 
holder or personality. 
A number of other legal issues in IP law require consideration of 
industry practices. For example, whether, in copyright cases, some-
thing is a scene á faire (a stock or commonplace element that is not 
protectable) is driven in part by customary practices. As the court 
described in Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Marvel Enterprises, 
whether one can use copyright law to protect characters that are 
mutant superheroes with special powers turns on the conventions 
of the superhero genre.173 Perhaps unsurprisingly, superheroes with 
special powers who are also mutants are a dime a dozen in the 
comic book world and therefore are not protectable. Similarly, in 
computer software, the doctrine of externalities denies copyright 
protection to aspects of software that are standard programming 
features. What is a standard programming feature may be driven in 
part by the demands of the industry served and by widely accepted 
programming practices within the computer industry.174 Accord-
ingly, custom provides some evidence of what those programming 
conventions are. 
E. Custom as Evidence of What Parties Intended 
Courts also consider custom in IP cases when determining par-
ties’ intentions in explicit and implied contracts, and in the analo-
gous contexts of interpreting terms in patent claims or specific 
statutory language. In such instances, custom is sometimes applied 
under the rubric of contract law rather than IP law.175 These uses of 
 
173 155 F. Supp. 2d 1, 37–38, 42–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
174 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs. v. Grace Consulting, 307 F.3d 197, 
214–15 (3d Cir. 2002); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 709–10 
(2d Cir. 1992). 
175 See, e.g., May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1367–68 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (looking to industry practices in architecture field to alter default rule that 
employer or commissioning party owns architectural drawings in pre-1976 Copyright 
Act case); Jim Henson Prods. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., 16 F. Supp. 2d 259, 262, 
267–77, 282, 285–86 & n.6, 288–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (relying on advertising industry 
practices and entertainment attorney conventions to determine that Henson retained 
copyright in puppets created for use in defendant’s commercials). But see Avedon v. 
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custom are the least problematic, as I discuss at greater length in 
Parts III and IV. 
III. CRITIQUE OF THE INCORPORATION OF CUSTOM INTO IP LAW 
In Parts I and II, I established that there are numerous custom-
ary practices and norms that have a profound influence on both de 
facto and de jure IP rights. As courts incorporate more and more 
customary practices into IP decisions, a feedback loop is created in 
which custom influences the law, the law reinforces the custom, 
and the custom then becomes further entrenched. While there are 
good reasons to criticize the de facto and de jure role of custom 
both as practical and doctrinal matters, I focus my analysis in this 
Part on a more theoretical critique of the incorporation of custom. 
There are three main justifications for incorporating custom into 
the law that have been asserted in other areas of the law. The first 
is the view, not without controversy, that a given industry has 
unique expertise to best determine the rules governing its own 
transactions. This is often phrased as the development of “optimal” 
practices or rules.176 The second main justification for incorporating 
custom is the fulfillment of parties’ expectations. This justification 
most clearly applies in the setting of contract law where the body 
of law is fundamentally about the satisfaction of the intentions of 
parties who negotiated and agreed to the relevant contract. The 
third main justification for incorporating custom into the law is that 
autonomy interests indicate that individuals or industries should 
establish their own governing rules, as opposed to the state order-
ing their relations. Accepting for purposes of this discussion that 
these justifications are generally legitimate, none of them justifies 
the incorporation of custom into IP law. 
 
Exstein, 141 F. Supp. 278, 279–80 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding that a general rule that 
copyright in commissioned work rests in the patron absent a specific contrary provi-
sion in the governing contract could not be overcome by contradictory trade usage). 
176 As I have noted, see supra note 22, looking at whether a legal rule is “optimal” 
requires an evaluation of what is the best possible outcome or rule given whatever 
metric of evaluation one is interested in. Law and economics scholars, for example, 
often evaluate whether a given rule is the most efficient or welfare-maximizing given 
the competing interests at stake. 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
2007] The Questionable Use of Custom in IP 1947 
A. Questionable Optimality of Industry-Driven Solutions 
One of the main reasons to consider adopting customary prac-
tices and norms into the law is if an assessment is made that an in-
dustry or community is likely to establish optimal practices, or at 
least rules preferable to those that would be independently devel-
oped by courts or legislatures.177 The development of custom in the 
IP context, however, confirms the concerns of some scholars in 
other fields that custom will develop in suboptimal ways and ulti-
mately be inferior to court or legislative resolutions.178 
As a preliminary matter, defining what is meant by an optimal 
allocation of IP rights is a challenging endeavor. A determination 
of what constitutes the best allocation of IP rights may depend on 
why one protects IP in the first place—a question for which there is 
 
177 See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Struc-
tural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 
1655–56, 1682–84, 1690, 1694–96 (1996) (suggesting that when industry-developed 
norms are likely to be efficient, courts should incorporate them into the law); Epstein, 
Confusion, supra note 2, at 831–32 (supporting the UCC’s incorporation of trade 
practices into contracts so long as the implied terms do not contradict or undermine 
explicit language in the relevant contract); Epstein, The T.J. Hooper, supra note 1, at 
4, 24–25 (contending in the tort context that a given industry is better situated than 
courts are to determine the optimal safety measures); cf. Kraus, supra note 1, at 409–
10 (concluding that although customs are not likely to be optimal, there are reasons to 
doubt that judge-made laws will be superior). 
178 In the tort context, for example, a number of well-regarded jurists and scholars 
have rejected the use of custom as a defense in negligence cases and concluded that, 
without independent legal analysis, industries are likely to develop suboptimal safety 
precautions. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (Holmes, 
J.) (rejecting custom as a defense in negligence case); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 
740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.) (same); Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100, 112 
(1884); Morris, supra note 3, at 1159–60 (arguing against treating conformity with cus-
tom as a complete defense in tort cases). The vast majority of courts in tort cases have 
agreed and rejected conformity with custom as a defense to a negligence action. See 
Epstein, The T.J. Hooper, supra note 1, at 8; Morris, supra note 3, at 1160 n.36. 
 Several prominent scholars have also challenged the optimality of customary prac-
tices and norms in the context of the UCC’s incorporation provisions, as well as more 
generally. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at 715, 736, 738–39, 751–52, 756 (noting 
that “there is no reason to expect [customs] to be optimal legally enforceable contract 
provisions or necessarily better provisions than a court could construct using any of a 
number of interpretive methods” and demonstrating that industries do not view their 
trade practices as optimal and that they will often change them if given a chance to 
reflect on what would be the best practices); Eric A. Posner, supra note 1, at 1698 
(noting that there is no reason to think that customs will develop in ways that are par-
ticularly optimal). 
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no single answer. There are many different views on the underlying 
reason(s) for protecting IP, ranging from an incentive-rationale 
theory to a labor-reward theory to moral rights and personality-
based theories.179 It is not necessary, however, to choose between 
these competing explanations or rationales in order to come to an 
understanding of what it means for an IP rule to be optimal. 
Whichever justification (or combination of justifications) for 
protecting IP rights is advanced, any governing IP rule requires 
consideration of both IP owners’ interests in protecting their works 
and IP users’ and the public’s interests in accessing and using those 
works. This is true in part because of the justifications for IP pro-
tection in and of themselves, but also because of countervailing 
free speech and liberty interests. The incentive rationale has a 
built-in argument for allowing access to and use of works. Under 
the incentive-rationale theory, copyrightable and patentable works 
are protected to encourage the production of creative and inven-
tive works more generally. The ultimate justification for the pro-
tection is to produce works that the public can enjoy and that other 
creators and inventors can build upon. If IP ownership rights were 
absolute, then this constitutionally protected goal would be 
thwarted. Moreover, the incentive rationale has a built-in ceiling, 
which eliminates the need for protection once no further incentive 
to produce exists. Accordingly, fulfilling the goals of the incentive 
rationale requires consideration of both IP creators and users. 
Moral and personality-based approaches also require some use of 
pre-existing works both for creative, artistic purposes and because 
there must be some recognition that users also have personality-
based rights in using others’ IP. When the integrity of the underly-
 
179 See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal 
and Political Theory of Property 168, 169–72 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). For cri-
tiques of some of these justifications, see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copy-
right: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. 
L. Rev. 281, 289–91 (1970) (finding labor-reward and personality-based theories for 
copyright to be inadequate and advocating the incentive rationale as the primary jus-
tification for copyright law); Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Pri-
vate Intellectual Property, in New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Prop-
erty, supra, at 138, 141 (arguing that the Lockean labor-reward theory should not 
apply to IP); Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 88, at 1717–18 (calling into question 
the validity of the incentive-rationale theory). Trademark law and the right of public-
ity have somewhat different justifications for their existence, which I will address 
shortly. See infra 1949. 
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ing work is not damaged and the creator’s interests are satisfied 
through attribution, these approaches should generally encourage 
the use of others’ IP. Perhaps a pure labor-reward rationale would 
exclude all unpermissive uses as a stand-alone theory, but it does 
not stand alone. It cannot justify all IP laws independently and is 
unquestionably limited by countervailing free speech, free expres-
sion, and liberty interests both within and external to IP laws. 
The question of how best to allocate patented and copyrighted 
works centers on whether a decentralized, industry-governed IP 
system is likely to adequately incentivize the production and distri-
bution of patents and copyrights and adequately protect authors’ 
and inventors’ interests, while at the same time guaranteeing ade-
quate use and access to other authors and inventors, and to the 
public at large. Trademark protection similarly must consider the 
protection of businesses’ goodwill and the prevention of consumer 
confusion, as well as the need for both consumers and competitors 
to refer to others’ trademarks. In the context of publicity rights, the 
law must consider both the need for the public to comment on and 
refer to public figures and also the rights of those figures to control 
and profit from the use of their identities. How exactly one would 
divide up these rights is a matter of much debate, but most people 
would agree that an optimal allocation of IP rights requires consid-
eration of these sometimes competing interests.180 
Given this model of optimal IP rules, the customary practices 
that develop in the IP context are not likely to best assess when the 
right to exclusive protection should yield to permit access and use. 
First, many of the prevalent customs are not developed with pri-
vate parties’ preferred allocations of rights in mind—much less the 
optimal societal allocation of rights. Instead, such customs often 
address more practical concerns, such as avoiding litigation or pre-
serving relationships by avoiding conflict. While these practices 
may be efficient between the parties themselves, for example when 
 
180 This is true regardless of whether one thinks an optimal allocation should be the 
most efficient one or the most just one. Depending on which of these metrics is used, 
the allocation might differ, but each requires some consideration of both owner and 
user interests. When efficiency and justice conflict, I would err on the side of a just 
rather than an efficient allocation, but, as I suggest, this distinction is not crucial for 
either the proposed framework in Part IV or my critique here of the incorporation of 
custom. 
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weighing litigation versus licensing costs, they should not be ex-
trapolated to define IP rights more generally or even in future 
transactions between the same parties. This is similar to the situa-
tion that arises when parties to a contract wish to be bound by gap-
filling terms based on custom for efficiency’s sake. These gap-
filling terms will not bind nonparties and outsiders to these indus-
try practices, and even the parties themselves will be able to opt 
out of the customary practices in future contracts. 
Second, even assuming that industry participants adopt practices 
with the intent to define IP rights in a way consistent with their pri-
vate preferences, the inequalities of IP markets and the underrep-
resentation of the public in the development of customary practices 
will lead to suboptimal allocations of rights. In fact, one of the 
main arguments against the incorporation of custom into tort law is 
that the market cannot adequately protect the interests of third 
parties or the public at large because neither has a direct role in the 
production of industry practices. Even plaintiffs who are in a direct 
relationship with a potential defendant, such as a consumer or an 
employee, may still lack bargaining power or sufficient market op-
tions to exert pressure on potential tortfeasors to develop optimal 
practices.181 
Third, to the extent optimal customs have been identified in 
other areas of law, they have generally arisen in close-knit commu-
nities in which community members have ongoing relationships 
and in which the same types of transactions are repeatedly con-
ducted. While these conditions are sometimes present in IP trans-
actions, they are not nearly as common as in many other industries. 
Finally, in the context of IP, the governing customs are often 
generated in response to legal regimes rather than on a clean slate. 
Those who argue that the private sector is superior at allocating 
rights because it is free to “independently” develop ideal rules 
overlook the legal shadow in which IP transactions take place. Cus-
 
181 I note that the disagreement over the optimality of customs with regards to safety 
measures is not driven entirely by the use of different metrics for evaluating optimal-
ity. Both Judge Hand and Professor Epstein agree that the evaluation of optimal 
safety measures requires a balancing of cost and effectiveness. See United States v. 
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). The difference is simply that 
Judge Hand concluded that courts are better situated than industries to conduct this 
balancing. 
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tomary practices are, therefore, unlikely to reflect an ideal private 
ordering and may not even reflect the intentions of the participants 
in the IP transactions. Instead, the practices often either reflect the 
exaggerated impact of single court decisions or represent rational, 
though suboptimal, reactions to legal uncertainty. Below, I will dis-
cuss in more detail each of these reasons to suspect that the cus-
tomary practices that develop in the realm of IP will be suboptimal. 
1. Customs Often Develop to Avoid Litigation or to Preserve 
Relationships 
As discussed in Part I, many of the industry practices that de-
velop in the IP context arise out of an interest in avoiding litigation 
and, to a lesser extent, an interest in preserving relationships be-
tween parties who repeatedly transact with one another. Given the 
downside of losing and the cost of litigation, paying licensing fees 
and engaging in other clearance culture practices can be rationally 
viewed as cost-effective business decisions.182 Why risk an expen-
sive lawsuit when a reasonable license fee can be paid? Why show 
a trademark in a television episode when digital technology (for a 
minor visual effects fee) facilitates its removal or blurring?183 There 
is no question that it is usually easier to ask permission to use an-
other’s IP and pay a fee for such a use than to litigate whether you 
needed permission to use such material in the first place.184 As the 
Sixth Circuit has noted, it is simply “cheaper to license than to liti-
gate.”185 
The development of more formal customs, such as guidelines, 
agreements and statements of best practices, is also driven by ef-
forts to avoid conflict and litigation. These guidelines and agree-
ments are not made because of any understanding of legal entitle-
ment or aspirational views of the optimal scope of IP rights. 
Instead, these customs simply reflect risk assessments by IP players 
 
182 See discussion supra Subsection I.A.1. 
183 Some of the decisions to remove or obscure trademarks are driven by an interest 
in promoting a strong market for payments for product placement in films and televi-
sion rather than by fear of trademark infringement or dilution actions. 
184 I use the term “another’s IP” somewhat loosely because the material for which 
clearance is sought often does not rise to the level of protectable IP, either because it 
does not meet the standards of patentability, copyrightability, or trademarkability, or 
because any such protection has expired. 
185 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 802 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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who have determined that these more formal guidelines or state-
ments are more cost-effective than expensive litigation in an uncer-
tain area of law. When courts look at these practices as a basis for 
rejecting infringement defenses, they are incorporating customs 
that were never intended to address the scope of IP rights and 
which do not reflect either an optimal or even a preferred alloca-
tion of such rights. 
The danger of allowing risk-averse customs to define the scope 
of IP rights should be apparent. As discussed, incorporating such 
behavior greatly expands infringement findings under trademark, 
copyright, patent, and publicity laws, while narrowing defenses to 
such infringements. Industry practices establish a highly restrictive 
IP regime—one in which virtually nothing is free and no use is a 
fair one. 
IP owners and users do not view licensing practices or copying 
guidelines as optimal nor as an expression of their preferred alloca-
tions of rights. Instead, users of IP, even those who routinely li-
cense, want the latitude to contest and sometimes litigate when a 
license is not granted or is prohibitively expensive. Moreover, even 
IP owners may not want clearance culture practices to establish IP 
rights because IP owners are often also users of IP. Although many 
IP owners seek broad IP rights and often unreasonably threaten 
litigation to expand the scope of their rights, most IP owners want 
to be able to use others’ IP without permission or payment in some 
circumstances. Accordingly, when IP owners and users license, 
there is no reason to assume that they want or intend the custom-
ary licensing practices to alter the governing legal rules.186 
Not all customs that have developed in the context of IP are 
driven by litigation avoidance; some have also been motivated by 
an interest in maintaining harmonious relations and easy access to 
IP works among repeat players. This is primarily true when the 
parties are likely to work with one another again over a period of 
time and may find themselves on either side of the IP owner/IP 
user divide. These relationship-preserving norms have been identi-
fied in other industries by Professor Lisa Bernstein as a basis for 
 
186 Although it is true that more powerful players, who are most often on the own-
ers’ side of transactions, will likely favor customs that promote owners’ interests, it is 
nevertheless also true that almost every IP owner uses others’ IP. 
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rejecting the incorporation of custom into contracts.187 These cus-
toms are not developed to be optimal governing rules but instead 
simply to promote harmony outside of the legal system.188 Nor is 
there any reason to conclude that customary practices will produce 
a fair compromise between the interests of IP owners and users be-
cause of the method of their development. Accordingly, there is no 
reason to conclude that such customs are likely to establish an op-
timal allocation of IP. 
2. Reactive Customs and Slippery Slopes 
A related reason that custom in the IP context is likely to de-
velop in a suboptimal manner is that the law has a tremendously 
powerful influence on its development—not just by motivating the 
adoption of litigation-avoidance practices, but more generally by 
encouraging a host of practices informed by great awareness of the 
surrounding IP law. Many IP owners employ attorneys and are 
knowledgeable about the governing legal regimes; therefore, much 
of the development of custom in IP has been driven by the law it-
self. Many scholars who have noted the value of privately gener-
ated norms have done so in large part because those norms have 
developed independently of the law.189 The heightened awareness 
of IP law by players in IP industries contrasts with many of these 
other communities in which custom has developed with little 
knowledge or awareness of the applicable laws.190 
The influence of law on IP custom can be seen, for example, in 
the increased licensing of photocopies for both research and class-
room use. The development of these practices was primarily a reac-
tion to the filing of a single lawsuit, a resulting settlement, and one 
subsequent trial court decision that rejected fair use. The settle-
 
187 Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s 
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1796–802 (1996). 
188 Id. (concluding that parties are likely to make concessions when relationships are 
harmonious that they would not want to make when the relationships are breached). 
189 See Ellickson, supra note 67, at 255–56 (suggesting that close-knit communities, 
such as the cattle ranchers of Shasta County, are more likely to develop welfare-
maximizing rules than outsider judges). 
190 Professor Robert Ellickson’s work exploring the practices of Shasta County cattle 
ranchers, for example, focused on a community that had a much less sophisticated 
understanding of the governing laws, little interaction with attorneys, and strong 
norms against resort to the legal system. See Ellickson, supra note 67, at 48–51, 60, 62. 
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ment in the NYU lawsuit,191 involving copying of materials for 
classroom use, led many universities and copy stores to license ma-
terial, even though there was no governing case law on the legiti-
macy or legality of copying works for use as course materials.192 A 
New York federal district court, in Basic Books v. Kinko’s, then in-
corporated these reactive licensing practices, holding that it was 
not a fair use to copy articles and other materials for the classroom, 
in part because of industry clearance practices.193 Those clearance 
practices, however, had only developed following the NYU settle-
ment. After the single trial court decision in Basic Books, most 
holdout universities and private companies started licensing mate-
rials.194 When the remaining holdouts challenged the trial court’s 
holding, appellate courts pointed to the prevalent licensing prac-
tices as a basis for rejecting fair use defenses.195 Thus, the practices 
that followed in the wake of a single settlement and a single court 
case further entrenched the custom and also reinforced legal 
precedents. 
Such “reactive” customs do not reflect the bottom-up, optimal 
private ordering that Adam Smith, with his “invisible hand,” or 
Professors Richard Epstein and Robert Ellickson have promoted. 
Instead, these customs simply reflect and amplify questionable 
court decisions.196 Unfortunately, because courts routinely look to 
customary practices as determinative of the fair use defense, these 
single court decisions and settlements have set in stone customary 
practices without appellate courts fully inquiring into whether the 
practices establish optimal allocations of IP. Customs developed in 
such circumstances are not market-driven solutions but instead are 
 
191 Addison-Wesley Publ’g v. N.Y. Univ., No. 82-Civ-8333, 1983 WL 1134, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
192 See Steven J. Melamut, 92 Law Libr. J. 157, 182 (2000); Bernard Zidar, Fair Use 
and the Code of the Schoolyard: Can Copyshops Compile Coursepacks Consistent 
with Copyright?, 46 Emory L.J. 1363, 1377 (1997) (citing Kenneth D. Crews, Copy-
right, Fair Use, and the Challenge for Universities 45 (1993)). 
193 Basic Books v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
194 See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th 
Cir. 1996). 
195 See id. at 1387–88. 
196 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial 
Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 784 (1999) (commenting on the danger that the UCC’s 
incorporation provision will influence and alter development of customary practices); 
McAdams, supra note 1, at 397–408 (describing interplay between norms and law). 
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reactive behaviors with little value for determining optimal IP 
rules. 
Consideration of custom in the law also prevents the continued 
evolution of custom by producing a lock-in effect—as discussed, 
the incorporation of custom further entrenches the same subopti-
mal customs.197 Professor James Gibson’s recent work on the use of 
IP licensing evidence has documented the troubling rights accre-
tion that stems from the courts’ consideration of licensing prac-
tices.198 When courts consider licensing evidence, parties are more 
likely to license, which makes courts more likely to once again rely 
on licensing evidence. This “doctrinal feedback”199 is emblematic of 
the much larger impact of incorporating customary practices and 
exacerbates herd behavior.200 At a certain tipping point, it makes 
more sense for an individual to follow the norm or custom, even if 
it is suboptimal, than to assert theoretical use rights. IP licensing 
practices exemplify this behavior. It is always more difficult to 
swim upstream. As more and more companies and individuals fol-
low the licensing and other litigation-avoidance practices, these 
customs drive conformity rather than the evolution of better prac-
tices. 
Moreover, there is a real danger that the incorporation of cus-
tom will create significant slippery slopes. If in every instance 
where a license could be purchased but is not a court concludes 
that the “customary price” has not been paid, and therefore rejects 
a fair use, First Amendment, or other defense, then such defenses 
will cease to exist. Consider the fact that individual songs can now 
be purchased on iTunes and other services for ninety-nine cents. If 
this fee is considered the customary price, then are all exchanges of 
songs without paying this fee unfair? Under the customary price 
language, the answer is yes—even if a song is exchanged among 
close friends or family, used as background music for a classroom 
project, or by a copyright professor making a point. The incorpora-
 
197 See Bernstein, supra note 187, at 1814–15. 
198 Gibson, supra note 123, at 884; see also Loren, supra note 123, at 6–7; Africa, su-
pra note 123, at 1148–49. 
199 Gibson, supra note 123, at 885. 
200 Abhijit V. Benerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. Econ. 797, 798 
(1992); Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural 
Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. Pol. Econ. 992, 994 (1992); Eric A. Posner, 
supra note 1, at 1717–18. 
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tion of custom into the market-effect and customary-pricing analy-
ses is therefore a slippery slope that will ultimately lead to the 
practical demise of copyright’s fair use defense. 
3. Market Inequities Skew the Development and Proof of Custom 
Some of the scholarly support for preferring custom over con-
gressional and court-made law is driven by concerns over the influ-
ence of special interest groups in the drafting and passage of legis-
lation. Epstein, for example, contends that reliance on custom 
“provides an effective bulwark against [the] bias and corruption” 
that pervade the legislative system.201 This idealized view of cus-
tomary practices fails to take into account the fact that the same 
powerful interest groups that influence legislation also control the 
creation and development of customary practices. The situation is 
arguably worse than the legislative process because there is no es-
tablished procedure that assures the open debate and public com-
mentary guaranteed in the context of pending legislation.202 Cus-
tomary IP practices and norms demonstrate the substantial 
influence of special interests in the development of customary 
practices. 
The development of custom in IP takes place in highly asymmet-
rical markets and is generally driven by the most powerful IP own-
ers. When parties do not have equal bargaining power and are not 
in reciprocal positions, suboptimal practices and norms are likely 
to develop. As Professor Eric Posner has observed in his critique of 
the reliance on norms as a source for legal rules, “once one aban-
dons the unrealistic assumption that parties have symmetrical posi-
tions, traditional theories of the efficiency of norms lose their 
power.”203 He suggests that “highly unequal endowments of group 
members may be evidence of inefficient norms. The more powerful 
members may prefer and enforce norms that redistribute wealth to 
 
201 Epstein, INS, supra note 1, at 86 (1992); see also Jessica Litman, Copyright Legis-
lation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L. Rev. 275, 312 & n.206 (1989) (describing 
the lack of representation of the public during copyright revision debates). 
202 Cf. Zaring, supra note 81, at 345–47 (criticizing administrative agencies’ reliance 
on industry statements of best practices in the absence of a public rulemaking and 
comment process). 
203 Eric A. Posner, supra note 1, at 1709. 
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them, even when those norms are inefficient.”204 Professor Lloyd 
Weinreb, in his response to Epstein’s advocacy of the use of cus-
tom in unfair competition cases, expressed a similar concern that 
the result of reliance on custom will be that “the better financed 
private interest” will prevail, rather than the development of a 
“careful, systematic” rule that “will serve the community as a 
whole.”205 Weinreb’s intuition has been borne out by both the de-
velopment and incorporation of custom in IP law. 
The most powerful IP owners have the greatest influence on 
both the creation and establishment of IP customs. The end result 
of this inequitable evolution is that smaller players in the IP mar-
kets and the public at large are inadequately represented by the 
emerging customs. The customary practices therefore tend to ex-
pand property holders’ rights and limit the use and access of IP by 
others. Although Epstein has hypothesized that no customs will 
develop when parties are in nonreciprocal, unequal circum-
stances,206 the development of customs in the IP context convinc-
ingly demonstrates otherwise. Customs do develop under such cir-
cumstances, but they are likely to be suboptimal customs as a result 
of their asymmetrical development. 
Many of the practices and norms that I discussed in Part I dem-
onstrate this skewed development. Both the Gentleman’s Agree-
ment and the Classroom Guidelines were negotiated and drafted 
primarily by publishers and therefore unsurprisingly forwarded the 
agenda of publishing companies with little concern or representa-
tion of the interests of scholars, educators, students, or research in-
stitutions. The Gentleman’s Agreement was negotiated by repre-
sentatives of a handful of nonresearch libraries and a single 
publishing trade group. The library representatives who were pre-
sent had strong ties to New York publishing houses and seemed 
more concerned with protecting themselves from liability than in 
furthering the cause of research and scholarship. Even if the library 
 
204 Id. at 1727. 
205 Lloyd L. Weinreb, Custom, Law and Public Policy: The INS Case as an Example 
for Intellectual Property, 78 Va. L. Rev. 141, 146–47 (1992). I note that Weinreb’s 
criticism of the use of custom in intellectual property cases seems somewhat inconsis-
tent with his position taken elsewhere advocating that fair uses be determined on the 
basis of long-standing customary practices. See Weinreb, supra note 28, at 1138–40. 
206 Epstein, INS, supra note 1, at 123; Epstein, The T.J. Hooper, supra note 1, at 12–
13. 
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representatives had more actively pursued researchers’ goals, they 
still would have been outmatched. The publishing association came 
armed with attorneys who drove much of the negotiations, while 
the library representatives had no legal representation and de-
ferred to the views of the publishing house lawyers.207 Similarly, the 
Classroom Guidelines were negotiated with little participation by 
educators and no participation by students, and were adopted over 
the opposition of major universities and scholarly organizations, 
such as the American Association of Law Schools.208 
The clearance culture is also driven by big players—both owners 
and users—for whom licensing fees are much cheaper than the po-
tential litigation down the road. Less well-financed users of IP can-
not always afford licensing fees and therefore must rely on fair use 
and other defenses to infringement. The smaller players in the IP 
markets are also much more likely to need to use others’ IP works 
than are more powerful IP holders. The most powerful IP holders 
therefore have little incentive to generate reciprocal customs or to 
grant licenses at reasonable rates. While there are unquestionably 
many IP transactions between equally powerful players and a sig-
nificant number of cases involving custom in which both parties are 
heavy hitters, the IP industry, overall, is not a place where most 
players are equally matched. Moreover, the customs developed 
and litigated by the most powerful IP owners and users then gov-
ern what the less powerful IP owners and users can do. 
The problem is not only that large IP producers establish custom 
instead of smaller producers or IP users, but also that the public is 
rarely represented in the development of the practices, codes, 
guidelines, or agreements that influence how IP can be used. The 
public should be entitled to use IP in many circumstances without 
permission: for example, to refer to trademarked products by 
name, to sing “Happy Birthday” at a child’s birthday party, or to 
criticize or comment on a public figure. By establishing customs 
that work for the largest IP owners and users, however, all unli-
censed uses of IP in circumstances where licensing is customary be-
come suspect. It is therefore particularly important to consider, as 
a first-order matter, the impact of IP laws on the public at large 
 
207 Saunders, supra note 46, at 165. 
208 See discussion supra Subsection I.A.2.b & note 61. 
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and on third parties who may be negatively affected by rules gov-
erning the scope of IP rights.209 
Another troubling result of the asymmetrical power differentials 
that lead to the creation of suboptimal rules is that more powerful 
parties are better able to prove their version of the governing prac-
tices. To determine what is the prevailing custom, courts must 
evaluate testimony of industry experts as to what are the relevant 
practices. It is not at all clear that it is easier for courts to deter-
mine what industry custom is than to conduct an independent 
analysis of what the law should be.210 Proving custom in court is dif-
ficult and costly, and better financed parties are likely to have their 
description of industry practices govern a court’s adjudication.211 
Additionally, larger companies are more likely to have written evi-
dence of industry practices in the form of guidelines or in-house 
policies. Courts are more likely to defer to these written expres-
sions of custom, and accordingly, these written guidelines are likely 
to be extremely influential, even if they do not accurately describe 
actual practice.212 
4. Many Uses of IP Do Not Involve Parties with Ongoing 
Relationships 
Sociological and legal literature examining the development of 
customary practices and the emergence of norms suggests that cus-
tomary practices are most likely to develop in circumstances where 
there are ongoing relationships and where similar transactions take 
 
209 See discussion infra Section III.B & Part IV. 
210 See generally Carter, supra note 6, at 132 (arguing against courts’ consideration 
of custom in IP cases due to the difficulty of jurists accurately determining what the 
applicable custom is). 
211 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 778–80. 
212 There is an opportunity for strategic behavior in the development of these guide-
lines and policies—parties can write down what they wish the custom were, rather 
than what it actually is. The statements of best practices are examples of this strategy, 
although from the perspective of the smaller players. See discussion supra Subsection 
I.A.2.d; infra Sections IV.C–D. A prominent example of such behavior outside the IP 
context is in international law, where states often try to create an evidentiary record 
to establish or oppose customary law without regard to what the actual customary 
practice is. See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law 54–55 (2003). 
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place over and over again.213 It is also in this context that customs 
are more likely to develop in an optimal manner because parties 
who repeatedly work together are likely to develop particular prac-
tices over time to facilitate their transactions. Epstein has con-
cluded that “custom should be followed in those cases in which 
there are repeat and reciprocal interactions between the same par-
ties, for then their incentives to reach the correct rule are exceed-
ingly powerful.”214 Ellickson has similarly concluded that close-knit 
communities are most likely to develop welfare-maximizing 
norms.215 In criticizing the enforcement of norms in the context of 
the Internet, Professor Mark Lemley has pointed out that “[i]t is 
no accident that virtually all of the empirical work on norms has 
taken place in small, close-knit communities with little change in 
membership over time.”216 As a community becomes larger and 
more diverse, there is less likely to be a “commonality of interest” 
and norms are both less likely to develop and more likely to de-
velop without uniform agreement.217  
Assuming that Epstein, Ellickson, and Lemley are correct about 
close-knit communities, IP customs are unlikely to be optimal or 
even preferable rules for allocating IP ownership and use rights be-
cause IP transactions often involve interactions in attenuated and 
unrelated communities. In contrast to many industries analyzed by 
scholars considering the development of customary practices and 
norms, many IP transactions do not involve repeat players or indi-
viduals who have any relationship with one another. A documen-
tary filmmaker likely has no relationship with the Elvis estate or 
Disney, and neither Disney nor the Elvis estate are likely to subse-
quently want to license or use any material created by a documen-
tary filmmaker. Nor does a person sitting at home making a mix 
tape, CD, or MP3 playlist have a relationship with particular bands 
or record companies, other than as a generic consumer. Thus, prac-
tices developed in the IP context are not as likely to set forth opti-
 
213 See, e.g., Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms 85–89 (1977); Bern-
stein, supra note 1, at 714; Ellickson, supra note 67, at 177–83; Epstein, INS, supra 
note 1, at 101. 
214 Epstein, INS, supra note 1, at 126. But see Eric A. Posner, supra note 1, at 1698 
(questioning the conclusion that close-knit communities develop optimal practices). 
215 Ellickson, supra note 67, at 167, 187, 228, 267, 283. 
216 Lemley, supra note 92, at 1267. 
217 Id. at 1268–69. 
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mal industry-wide standards as those developed in more closely 
knit communities. 
B. Intellectual Property Should Not Be Expectations Driven 
Another primary justification for incorporating custom into the 
law is that custom often reflects parties’ expectations. Much of the 
literature supporting the incorporation of custom into contract law 
reflects the goal of furthering contracting parties’ intentions and 
expectations. Contract law is itself about facilitating agreements 
between private parties. To the extent that custom plays a role in 
those expectations, it makes sense to incorporate custom into con-
tracts as an expression of the contracting parties’ understanding.218 
Even Lisa Bernstein, who is highly critical of the incorporation 
of custom into contracts, bases her critique on an expectations-
based model. She points to the fact that parties would not, absent 
the explicit UCC provision, expect or want customs to be read into 
contracts because, based on her empirical work, such customary 
practices were developed primarily to preserve relationships rather 
than to apply in “end-game” disputes when both the contract and 
relationship are breached.219 Bernstein contends that courts im-
properly apply custom by using it in ways other than those in-
tended by the parties who create and follow these practices. 
Similarly, in the IP context, parties would not want their custom-
ary practices to govern court determinations of rights. For exam-
ple, Warner Brothers might want to license a Disney clip, not be-
cause it thinks it has to, but because the two companies are likely 
to do many similar exchanges with one another and Warner Broth-
ers will want to maintain goodwill with Disney; however, when 
Warner Brothers chooses not to license a Disney clip, or any other 
clip for that matter, it will certainly not want the fact that it gener-
 
218 See, e.g., Epstein, Confusion, supra note 2, at 822–29 (suggesting that parties may 
use custom in contract setting as a common ground of understanding or as an efficient 
shortcut for needing to negotiate specific contract terms); cf. Epstein, The T.J. 
Hooper, supra note 1, at 7 (suggesting that following custom may provide useful cer-
tainty for involved parties). 
219 Bernstein, supra note 187, at 1796; Bernstein, supra note 1, at 769–70; see also 
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpre-
tation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1859 (1991). 
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ally does so when promoting its relationships to govern the legal 
outcome in a case where it has chosen not to license. 
Not only are expectations and parties’ preferred choices in the 
IP context likely to weigh against incorporating custom, but be-
cause of the more attenuated nature of the IP markets, there are 
less likely to be shared expectations between parties in IP disputes. 
Most IP cases involve parties who have no direct relationship with 
one another. The IP markets and communities also are so diverse 
that there is not likely to be a shared sense of what standards ap-
ply. The fact that the interests at stake are competing ones, often 
held by parties who are not in market relationships, makes it 
unlikely that the parties will have a shared set of expectations. 
Even if the customary practices did represent parties’ expecta-
tions, IP is an area of the law, unlike contracts, where expectations 
should play little role. Customs may lead to expectations about 
what will occur but generally do not contain any normative evalua-
tion of what ought to or should be. Even where norms are in-
volved, one subgroup’s or one community’s evaluation of what 
should be may not comport with general principles for why we pro-
tect IP. Moreover, one community’s views may not be in sync with 
the views of other communities. In contract cases, the lack of nor-
mative evaluation usually doesn’t matter because courts should 
generally seek to enforce, as a normative matter, whatever terms 
the parties agreed to be bound by without regard to society at 
large.220 Outside of contract law, however, the incorporation of cus-
tom and norms removes the evaluative role of legal analysis, lead-
ing to the troubling result that what is becomes what should be. 
In tort law there has been significant scholarly debate about this 
very issue with regard to the standard for negligence and, in par-
ticular, whether the negligence standard should be governed by 
parties’ expectations or by a more objective standard. Judge Rich-
ard Posner views tort law not as furthering general public policy 
objectives, but instead as a mechanism for fulfilling parties’ expec-
tations when no formal contract governs a transaction. “[T]he prin-
ciple function of tort law,” he has written from the bench, “[is] to 
protect customers’ reasonable expectations that the firms with 
 
220 Contract law does have a public policy or unconscionability exception, but it is 
generally narrowly construed. 
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which they deal are complying with the standard of care customary 
in the industry.”221 Epstein similarly contends that customary prac-
tices should be the standard of negligence when parties have some 
connection to one another, even when the relationship is inequita-
ble, such as between employer and employee and retailer and con-
sumer.222 
I am not alone in disagreeing with Judge Posner and Professor 
Epstein on this point and in contending that public policy demands 
something more from tort law than deference to parties’ expecta-
tions. Conformity with an industry practice may best reflect par-
ties’ expectations, but as a matter of public policy there is concern 
that safety precautions will lag if an expectations or custom-based 
standard is adopted.223 The fact that a plaintiff was on notice of a 
danger should not in and of itself end the inquiry. Tort law, like IP 
law, is not another form of contract law in which individual parties’ 
expectations drive the law. Instead, both bodies of law are in ser-
vice to a higher purpose. Tort liability is not solely about the par-
ties before the court but is also about making society safer, protect-
ing third parties, and deterring bad or dangerous behavior. 
Moreover, even if an injured plaintiff expected no more than con-
formity with industry custom, broader public policy objectives pro-
vide a strong basis to protect such individuals. Given the bargain-
ing power and knowledge base of potential tort victims, it makes 
sense to protect consumers from the race to the bottom that may 
result from deference to industry standards. Instead, tort law 
should require an objective, external evaluation of what is a rea-
sonable standard of care. 
In the context of traditional property rights, scholars have simi-
larly debated whether expectations should drive property rights. 
Property rights often have been justified on the basis of expecta-
 
221 Rodi Yachts v. Nat’l Marine, 984 F.2d 880, 889 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) 
(holding that customary practices determined negligence). 
222 Epstein thinks strict liability should apply when third parties or strangers are in-
jured. Epstein, The T.J. Hooper, supra note 1, at 4–5 & n.14. Courts, however, have 
not followed his suggestions for expanding strict liability. 
223 See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903); The T.J. Hooper, 
60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932); Mayhew v. Sullivan Mining Co., 76 Me. 100, 112 
(1884); Morris, supra note 3. 
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tions of entitlement to particular property.224 Professor Carol Rose 
has emphasized in her writings, however, that even though a party 
may expect certain property rights, those rights should yield when 
they are unjust or otherwise not deserving of enforcement.225 Rose 
emphasizes that expectations must often be frustrated to manage 
or protect scarce resources or to promote social justice, tasks that 
often require limits on property rights.226 
An analysis of IP law supports the views held by scholars critical 
of relying on expectations-based models for tort and property law, 
and presents an even more compelling case for not furthering par-
ties’ expectations. Neither the expectations of IP owners or risk-
averse IP users should govern the scope of IP rights. Patent and 
copyright protections are provided by constitutional grant and ex-
plicitly require consideration of the public interest separate from the 
property rights of IP owners. Copyright and patent laws do not 
have as their primary purpose promoting authors’ rights, but in-
stead promoting the public interest more broadly. The U.S. Consti-
tution expressly states that the “exclusive Right to . . . Writings and 
Discoveries” is granted for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.”227 Accordingly, courts have often 
noted that they must “subordinate the copyright [or patent] 
holder’s interest in maximum financial return to the greater public 
interest in the development of art, science and industry.”228 In the 
trademark context, trademark protection is primarily driven by a 
motivation to protect consumers from confusion, and businesses 
are protected only for the purpose of ultimately promoting the 
public interest in high quality, easily identifiable goods and ser-
vices.229 In fact IP, more so than many other areas of the law, re-
quires consideration of negative externalities worked on third par-
ties. 
 
224 See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in The Theory of Legis-
lation 111, 137 (Boston, Weeks, Jordan & Co. 1840); Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of 
Property 28–31 (2000). 
225 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Left Brain, Right Brain and History in the New Law and 
Economics of Property, 79 Or. L. Rev. 479, 485–86 (2000). 
226 Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations on Ameri-
can Law, 2000 Utah L. Rev. 1, 19, 22. 
227 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
228 Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966). 
229 See Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion, supra note 29, at 124–30, 190–91. 
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An IP holder might expect, especially given the clearance cul-
ture, that no unlicensed uses would be made of her work, yet pub-
lic policy demands the use of modest amounts of material for 
commentary, scholarship, or other creative or useful works. If the 
public or IP owners have a particularly narrow view of the scope of 
IP rights, these absolute property expectations should not alter the 
congressional or constitutional judgment about how best to bal-
ance IP holders’ rights with the public’s right to use and access IP. 
Consider one recent example: The New York Times last year hired 
a major Los Angeles talent agency to represent it in negotiations 
for licensing its news stories.230 Many novels, stories, poems, mov-
ies, television shows, and even law school exams have been in-
spired by (or based on) news articles, including some by journalists 
for the New York Times. The facts underlying these news stories 
are not copyrightable. Nevertheless, screenwriters, studios, and 
publishers often license such stories as a matter of goodwill and to 
ensure assistance in locating additional information that might be 
useful for their projects. The New York Times’s expectation that it 
can extract compensation from Hollywood and others should not, 
however, alter the scope of copyright law or the general principle 
that facts are in the public domain. Even if most newspapers, 
rather than one paper on its own, expect the licensing of their news 
stories, courts should not treat this expectation as a meaningful ba-
sis to alter longstanding copyright laws. 
Expectations are driven by customs and therefore lock in exist-
ing property regimes, even when they are unjust and even if the 
party with expectations would prefer an alternative property re-
gime.231 Accordingly, fulfilling expectations cannot justify the in-
corporation of custom into IP law. 
C. Autonomy Interests Weigh Against Incorporation of IP Customs 
A third common justification for incorporating custom into the 
law is that autonomy interests favor private over public ordering. 
Early justifications for the common law expressed a preference for 
communities being governed by their own customary laws that had 
 
230 Lorne Manly, Times Hires Talent Agency, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 2006, at E2. 
231 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 225, at 490–91; see also Carol M. Rose, Canons of 
Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 Yale L.J. 601, 625 (1998). 
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evolved over a period of time. These laws not only would further 
parties’ expectations of how given behavior would be treated, but 
also would inject a degree of community self-governance and 
autonomy in what would otherwise be a suspect rulemaking proc-
ess handed down from a monarchy. Today, the democratic process 
allows communities to contribute in a more orderly fashion to the 
creation of governing laws, and, accordingly, the appeal of the 
common law has faded. But even in more contemporary legal de-
bates, the issue of whether laws should be driven by the private or 
the public sphere continues to fuel many discussions. 
Contracts represent the height of private ordering, and the asso-
ciated body of law is primarily developed to promote autonomous 
private relationships.232 Similarly, in the area of family law some 
scholars have pointed to autonomy concerns as a basis for arguing 
that the state should support and facilitate customary relationships 
that are formed by individuals, rather than dictating the form that 
such relationships should take.233 For example, some contend that 
legal recognition should be given to cohabitating, unmarried cou-
ples, including same-sex couples, because the government should 
honor these “customary” relationships and reflect the reality of 
their relationships.234 
The argument for deference to private ordering makes the most 
sense in contract law, and some sense in family law, where intimate 
and private aspects of our lives are expressed, but this deference to 
private ordering does not make sense in the IP context. IP rights, 
especially patents and copyrights, are statutory grants of limited 
property rights in exchange for the public disclosure of works and 
innovations. Thus, there is essentially a social contract that offers 
property-like rights over patented inventions and discoveries and 
copyrighted works in exchange for making those works public and 
agreeing to their regulation by the state. Although a work is copy-
righted upon fixation regardless of whether it is published, in-
fringement actions require demonstration of access to the work. 
Additionally, to the extent that a party wishes to monetize the 
copyrighted work it must be made public—something it is assumed 
 
232 Charny, supra note 219, at 1823. 
233 See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency 
20–22 (2004). 
234 See id. at 106–07. 
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that authors and copyright holders will want to do. Similarly, 
trademarks are about marking and publicizing one’s products and 
services, and the right of publicity is expressly about controlling or 
profiting from one’s identity when made public. The exchange and 
value of IP therefore derives from its prominent and very public 
presence. 
Accordingly, the autonomy interests that may justify self-
ordering in other spheres do not justify deference to custom in IP 
law. Even if a moral rights or personality rights-based approach to 
IP were taken (admittedly a basis that has been mostly rejected in 
IP law in the United States) there is still a bargain worked by the 
legal protection that requires some relinquishment of autonomy in-
terests when one makes one’s IP works public. 
IV. TOWARD A THEORY OF CUSTOM FOR IP 
Thus far I have discussed reasons why customary IP practices 
and norms are not likely to be good alternatives for independently 
developed judicial and legislative rulemaking. There is, however, a 
big difference between concluding that custom should not be in-
corporated wholesale as law or legal rules and concluding that evi-
dence of customary practices should never be admissible in IP 
cases. There are inquiries in IP law, and elsewhere, for which cus-
tomary practices are relevant and not unduly prejudicial.235 In such 
instances it is appropriate, and may be necessary, for courts to con-
sider evidence of customary practices and norms. The central task 
of this Part is to provide a theoretical framework for determining 
when particular customs are more or less valuable in IP cases. The 
greater the value of a custom, the more likely it is to be relevant 
and nonprejudicial. 
I present six main vectors along which customs should be situ-
ated to determine whether the customs are likely to provide mean-
ingful information. The vectors evaluate the certainty of the cus-
tom, the motivation for the custom, the representativeness of the 
 
235 Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Nevertheless, 
relevant evidence is not admissible “if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
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custom, how the custom is applied (both for what proposition and 
against whom), and the implications of the custom’s adoption. 
When a custom is certain, was developed by a representative 
group, and is applied only to stand in for a first-order inquiry, such 
as what is generally done or what the parties intended, it has the 
most value. When, however, a custom is uncertain, was developed 
in an unrepresentative manner for litigation-avoidance reasons, 
and is applied for a normative or other second-order proposition 
against an unrepresented party, it holds no value. In this Part, I de-
velop the nuances of this theory in more detail. Although my 
analysis focuses on issues that arise in IP law, these insights can 
also shed light on how custom should be evaluated in other areas 
of the law. 
A. Certainty of Custom 
The first vector that must be considered when evaluating the 
merits of a particular custom is whether the custom in question is 
certain. To have any value, a custom must be identifiable, in terms 
of what constitutes the practice itself, and the practice must also be 
widely accepted and followed. 
Often different parties will have different views of whether there 
is a custom and, if there is, what the custom actually is. Lisa Bern-
stein’s surveys of numerous industries have led her to conclude 
that few industries have customs that a majority of participants can 
agree on.236 The IP industries are no exception. For example, while 
most networks and studios have adopted licensing policies for 
trademarks, some companies have steadfastly refused to license, 
blur, or delete any trademarks that appear in programming.237 Even 
when it comes to using copyrighted works, the governing custom is 
sometimes unclear. In Roy Export, the case involving film clips 
used in a tribute to Charlie Chaplin at the time of his death, there 
were in fact two competing customs at issue.238 One custom was for 
networks to license film clips—this was the one the court consid-
 
236 Bernstein, supra note 1, at 714–15. 
237 See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 917 (C.D. Ill. 
2003); Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257–58 
(N.D. Cal. 2003). 
238 Roy Exp. Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982); 
see also discussion supra Part II. 
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ered. But there was another custom: networks generally did not li-
cense clips when they were used in news obituaries and breaking 
news stories.239 When there are such competing customs, the cus-
tom is less certain and therefore will have substantially less value. 
When there is disagreement as to the governing practice, evalua-
tors should err on the side of concluding that no custom exists 
rather than trying to determine which of the competing customs is 
dominant.240 
Several considerations can help ascertain how certain a particu-
lar custom is. First, if there is unanimity as to the custom across a 
diverse set of parties and interests, then the custom is likely to exist 
and have clearly definable boundaries. Second, customs that are 
long-standing are more stable and hence more certain because they 
have weathered the test of time. In contrast, customs of recent vin-
tage are more likely to change or be short-lived reactions to tech-
nological changes. Customs need time to reach equilibrium and be 
adopted by a large number of relevant community members before 
one can say that a custom is certain. 
This examination of whether a custom is long-standing contrasts 
with the traditional Blackstonian account.241 I do not adopt the 
Blackstonian view that rights should be accorded on the basis that 
a custom has existed since time immemorial. As I have discussed, 
the fact that a custom is long-standing does not suggest that it is an 
optimal legal rule. Instead, the value of a long-standing custom is 
that such longevity indicates stability and a greater likelihood of 
ascertainability. 
The clearer the custom and the greater the unanimity of partici-
pation in and uniformity of the description of that custom, the 
more likely the custom is to have value. The more obscure a cus-
tom and the greater the disagreement about the prevailing prac-
tice, the less weight should be given to the custom. (See Table 1.1 
 
239 Although there was evidence in the case that CBS did clear clips used in some 
shows and obituaries and had sought a license in the instant case, the general practice 
in the television industry at the time was not to clear film clips when used in nightly 
news broadcasts or obituary segments. See Testimony of Robert Eaton, Roy Exp. Co. 
Establishment of Vaduz v. CBS, Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (No. 78-Civ. 
2417), reprinted in Excerpts of Record at 682–93, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d. Cir. 1981) (Nos. 
81-7027, 81-7109). 
240 Cf. Lemley, see supra note 92, at 1275. 
241 Blackstone, supra note 4, at *76. 
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below.) Consider the following two examples that I will place along 
the certainty continuum: The faculty exception, which allows fac-
ulty to hold the copyrights to their scholarship and classroom ma-
terials, is a clear and long-standing custom, almost universally ac-
cepted and followed; as such, it has more value along this one 
vector. The custom in Roy Export regarding clearance of film clips 
in news shows is less certain since there were two conflicting cus-
toms. These practices may have some value, but certainly would 
not be viewed as of high value given the conflicting testimony 
about the relevant practice. The lowest value should be given to a 
practice which, though identifiable, has not been adopted or recog-
nized by a majority of relevant community members. 
 
Table 1.1: Certainty Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
Uncertain ! Competing Customs ! Clear, Long-Standing Custom Unanimously Recognized 
B. Motivation for Custom 
Another crucial vector to analyze when weighing the value of a 
custom is the motivation for the development of that custom. As 
discussed in Part III, when customs develop to avoid litigation or to 
preserve relationships, they do not provide meaningful information 
relevant to establishing an optimal allocation of rights, nor do par-
ties expect or want such customs to alter existing IP rights. 
The discounting of customs motivated by litigation avoidance is 
not without precedent in IP law, though it is a minority approach 
primarily appearing in patent law. In patent cases, courts look at 
industry customs as evidence of whether an invention is patentable 
or whether an issued patent is valid. Licensing practices can pro-
vide evidence that an invention or patent is respected in the indus-
try and therefore nonobvious—one of the key requirements for 
patentability.242 A number of courts in patent cases, however, have 
 
242 See, e.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 56 (1923) 
(holding that the fact that two-thirds of the market had licensed a patent was 
“weighty evidence” that the patent was valid); WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 
184 F.3d 1339, 1359–60 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that the existence of a licensing mar-
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observed that patents are frequently licensed to avoid hold-up 
problems, preserve relationships, or simply to avoid costly litiga-
tion. These courts have accordingly recognized the limited value of 
this licensing evidence and restricted consideration of licensing 
practices to circumstances where there is evidence that the licens-
ing was motivated primarily by an evaluation of a patent’s valid-
ity.243 
When a custom develops with an aspirational purpose in mind, it 
has more value. For example, the attribution norms of French chefs 
and the Creative Commons seek to provide an appropriate balance of 
protection of intangible assets with access and use of those assets by 
others. Accordingly, such practices have more value than customs 
motivated by less normative concerns. This conclusion does not mean 
that such aspirational norms should be adopted wholesale, but simply 
makes them more worthy of consideration than those which have de-
veloped with nonnormative objectives in mind. 
Accordingly, customs motivated by litigation avoidance, rela-
tionship preservation, and other nonnormative considerations, 
such as the clearance culture and the Gentleman’s Agreement, 
generally should be discounted. When customs instead are moti-
vated by independent judgments about preferred or appropriate 
allocations of IP rights, such aspirational customs should be given 
the most weight. Intermediate weight should be given to mixed-
purpose customs that may be motivated by some normative con-
 
ket is evidence of nonobviousness); see also 2 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents 
§ 5.05[3] (2006). 
243 See, e.g., John E. Thropp’s Sons Co. v. Seiberling, 264 U.S. 320, 329–30 (1924) 
(discounting evidence of licensing when licensing was deemed a reasonable sum to 
“purchase . . . peace” and “a wise course for the smaller manufacturer”); EWP Corp. 
v. Reliance Universal, 755 F.2d 898, 907–08 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (noting that licensing is 
often driven by concerns other than validity, such as being “mutually beneficial” or 
being cheaper than defending an infringement action); Dotolo v. Quigg, 12 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1032, 1038 (D.D.C. 1989) (limiting consideration of licensing to circum-
stances in which patentee demonstrated that licensing was prompted by “non-
obviousness of his product and not other business reasons, such as the cost of defend-
ing an infringement suit”); cf. Polydoros v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 207, 212 (Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting argument that general clearance of names 
in film industry could form basis of negligence claim for the appropriation of plain-
tiff’s identity, and noting that “[t]he industry custom of obtaining ‘clearance’ estab-
lishes nothing, other than the unfortunate reality that many filmmakers may deem it 
wise to pay a small sum up front for a written consent to avoid later having to spend a 
small fortune to defend unmeritorious lawsuits such as this one”). 
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cerns, such as wanting to compensate creators as a matter of what 
is just, but also by other less meaningful considerations, such as 
litigation costs. This middle ground is similar to the evidence of li-
censing in patent cases, where courts require independent evidence 
that the custom at issue was motivated by a valuation of the inven-
tion, rather than solely by cost-benefit analysis and litigation 
avoidance. (See Table 1.2 below.) 
 
Table 1.2: Motivation Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
Purely Practical Concern 
(E.g., litigation avoidance, 
relationship preservation, etc.) 
! Mixed Purpose ! Solely Aspirational 
C. Representativeness of Custom 
Customs that represent only one party’s or one group’s interests 
should be suspect. By contrast, when a custom develops with input 
and participation of both IP owners and users and large and small 
players in the IP industries, it is more meaningful. As discussed, 
because the development of many IP customs is motivated primar-
ily by IP owners’ interests (for example, the Gentleman’s Agree-
ment and the Classroom Guidelines), such customs do not provide 
meaningful information on the best allocation of IP rights. 
While some scholars have suggested preferring IP users to own-
ers,244 I see no reason to favor one-sided customs regardless of 
which side is preferred. Practices developed solely by users are 
likely to be just as bad at balancing IP rights as those developed 
solely by owners. Although it is true that the downside of an open 
access regime may be less than that of a closed access regime, both 
approaches will lead to allocations of IP that are suboptimal. 
Consider the Filmmakers’ Statement that is supposed to set 
forth fair use rules for using others’ IP works in documentary 
films.245 There is no reason to think that the Filmmakers’ Statement 
achieves its purported goals of setting forth reasonable uses or 
even of accurately stating existing practices since it was developed 
 
244 See supra note 163. 
245 Filmmakers’ Statement, supra note 19, at 1. 
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in an unrepresentative fashion. Virtually no IP owners or produc-
ers whose works the filmmakers would want to use were involved 
or consulted during the development of the Statement. Moreover, 
even within the special interest group of documentary filmmakers, 
few individual documentary filmmakers were consulted for the 
Statement. As a result, the best practices statement itself does not 
accurately represent even the interests of its purported constitu-
ency. The Statement limits editorial and content choices far more 
than what most filmmakers would be willing to concede. For ex-
ample, the Statement prohibits cutting video footage to the beat of 
music recorded on location and prevents the designing of projects 
around copyrighted works, a limitation that would prevent most 
films and commentary about film, visual works, and other impor-
tant cultural works. Furthermore, most documentary filmmakers 
conform with the clearance culture, so the Statement is not even an 
accurate description of existing practices. 
Table 1.3 below sets forth a continuum of representativeness. 
When only a single interest is represented, the resulting custom is 
at its nadir of value. As more and more interests are represented, a 
custom becomes increasingly meaningful. In particular, when both 
IP owners and users are engaged in the development of custom and 
are both equally able to further their interests, a more optimal al-
location of IP rights is likely. Moreover, when both small and big 
players in IP are represented, a custom is more valuable. 
Licensing practices are a good example of a practice that makes 
a lot of sense for well-financed, bigger IP users, but makes less 
sense or may be impracticable for those with shoestring budgets. 
Thus, even those who are ostensibly on the same side of issues–for 
example, IP users–sometimes have divergent interests that must be 
represented. Customs that represent the interests of a variety of IP 
owners and users of different levels of power and financing are also 
more likely to best protect the interests of the public at large. 
 
Table 1.3: Representativeness Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
One Interest Only ! Several Parties ! All Potential Interests Represented 
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D. Application of Custom 
1. Against Whom 
It is impossible to analyze the value of a given custom without 
considering against whom it is asserted and for what proposition. 
As discussed, customs are more valuable when they are developed 
with greater representation from a diverse set of interests. Accord-
ingly, when customs are applied within the group or groups that 
developed the relevant custom, the custom is more deserving of in-
corporation. In such circumstances, the customs further expecta-
tions between parties who are in direct relationships with one an-
other without generally harming the interests of third parties or the 
public at large. In contrast, when customs are asserted against 
those who did not participate in their development, they are the 
most suspect. 
Customary “agreements” in IP law, such as the Classroom 
Guidelines, the Gentleman’s Agreement, and best practices state-
ments, though not strictly speaking contracts, may rise to the level 
of quasi-contractual agreements between the parties who negoti-
ated them, but third parties should not be bound by such trade 
agreements or other understandings of “reasonable uses” when 
they did not agree to them and their interests were not adequately 
represented in their development. The Gentleman’s Agreement 
and Classroom Guidelines should therefore have no force against 
scholars and libraries that were not represented in their develop-
ment. Where a party was represented by a trade group of which 
she is a member (or even if she is not, if her interests were ade-
quately represented), then there should be some value, but not the 
highest value, given to customs as applied to that individual. (See 
Table 1.4 below.) For example, a documentary filmmaker repre-
sented by the Documentary Association could justifiably be held to 
a higher standard of compliance with the Documentary Filmmak-
ers’ Statement. 
 
Table 1.4: Application Against Whom Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
Out-Group ! Represented Interest ! Party/In-Group 
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2. For What Proposition 
To evaluate the worth of customs, one must also consider for 
what proposition the given custom is asserted. When custom is as-
serted as a purported indicator of market effects or of optimality, 
in the sense of providing the most efficient market allocation of 
rights, custom should be disfavored for the reasons discussed in 
Section III.A. Similarly, if a custom developed without a normative 
component, then it should not be considered when looking at a 
normative inquiry, such as what is a fair or reasonable use. 
When customs are motivated by aspirational goals, however, 
they may have some value for determining what is fair or reason-
able. Ascertaining “reasonable” uses of another’s IP is a challeng-
ing endeavor and what is normally done provides a limited amount 
of nonconclusive evidence of what reasonable uses might be. 
Norms that favor attribution, for example, have some value when 
analyzing unconsented uses of another’s IP if such attribution prac-
tices are developed by a representative sample of IP owners and 
users, and therefore reflect some consensus as to what a reasonable 
or appropriate use is. 
When applied for nonnormative propositions, customary prac-
tices developed for nonnormative reasons may also have some 
value. For example, in trademark law whether consumers are likely 
to be confused by a use of another’s IP may be tied up with con-
sumers’ understanding of industry customs. If there is a widespread 
industry practice of product placement—payment by trademark 
holders for the inclusion of their products in TV shows and mov-
ies—then consumers who see trademarked products in such works 
will be more likely to think that such products appeared with the 
trademark holders’ consent (and likely their payment as well). Ac-
cordingly, the industry practice may provide some relevant evi-
dence of likely confusion as to sponsorship.246 
Custom also may provide relevant information when used to in-
terpret IP contracts, trade agreements, policies and guidelines, and 
patent claims. In each of these instances, it makes sense to look at 
custom to assist in accurately understanding trade-specific lan-
 
246 There still may be a fair use or use protected by the First Amendment in such an 
instance, but the customary practice is relevant to the initial question of consumer 
confusion. 
ROTHMAN_BOOK 11/19/2007 3:14 PM 
1976 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 93:1899 
guage, in the same way that courts look to custom to interpret con-
tract terms. Again, this furthers parties’ expectations without third-
party harm and facilitates the optimal allocation of IP rights by aid-
ing parties in best describing their agreements and the scope of 
their IP. Table 1.5 below sets forth the continuum from no value 
when customs are used to evaluate efficient allocations of IP or 
market effects to the highest value when the customs are applied as 
positive propositions of what is generally done in an industry or 
what is meant by certain industry-specific terms. 
 
Table 1.5: Application For What Proposition Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
To Determine 
Market Effects or 
Market Efficiency 
! 
As Normative Evaluation 
(no value if 
nonaspirational custom) 
!
As Positive Proposition 
for What Is Generally 
Done 
E. Implications of Custom 
When evaluating the worth of a particular custom, one must also 
consider what the end result of using that custom would be. If fol-
lowed to its logical conclusion, will the custom in question result in 
a slippery slope, such that no uses will be allowed, or, alternatively, 
that too many uses will be allowed?247 In either slippery slope sce-
nario, the custom should be dismissed. Consider, for example, two 
extremes. If it is customary to license everything, then no fair uses 
remain. Similarly, if it is customary to swap music online, then 
there will be no remaining rights of IP holders available to restrict 
the copying of music in digital formats. In either case, such slippery-
slope customs should be dismissed out of hand. 
Another crucial consideration is what effect adopting such a cus-
tom will have on IP rights for creators, inventors, users, and the 
public at large. Customary practices must be independently evalu-
ated to determine whether a particular custom is a good solution to 
the problem of how to allocate IP rights as an objective matter. In 
particular, customs should be evaluated to see if they meet the 
 
247 See generally Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1026 (2003) (examining the characteristics and merits of “slippery slope” ar-
guments in general). 
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goals of distributive justice inherent in IP regimes. There should be 
an independent consideration of what reasonable people would 
agree to if they did not know whether they would be IP owners or 
users, nor whether they would be powerful or minor players in the 
IP markets. This approach to evaluating the allocation of IP rights 
will help to determine the appropriate balance of competing inter-
ests. Requiring some birds-eye evaluation of the customary prac-
tices also allows for the practices related to IP works to evolve 
rather than being locked in by the courts. 
Table 1.6 below sets forth a continuum of no-value slippery-
slope customs to the highest-value customs that are independently 
evaluated as the best possible allocation of IP rights, given the in-
terests of both IP owners and users and big and small players. 
 
Table 1.6: Implications of Adopting Custom Vector 
 
No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 
Slippery Slope ! Third Party Impact Unlikely ! 
Best Possible Allocation of 
Competing Interests 
F. Combining the Vectors 
The interplay between these vectors is complex and many cus-
toms will fall in different categories of no value, some value or 
highest value in different vectors. 
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Table 1.7: Custom Vectors 
 
 No Value  Some Value  Highest Value 












! Mixed Purpose ! Solely Aspirational 
Representa-






















What Is Generally 
Done 






I contend that when any one of these vectors indicates that a cus-
tom has no value, the custom should generally be rejected in its en-
tirety. There are, however, two main exceptions to this principle. 
The first is when the trade practice is developed between parties 
with a direct relationship and the agreement as to the given prac-
tice rises to the level of an explicit, implied, or quasi contract. In 
such circumstances, the reasons for allowing private ordering are at 
their peak, as such ordering furthers parties’ expectations and gen-
erally does not negatively affect third parties. If the relevant cus-
tom, however, may result in a slippery slope or if one of the parties 
appeared to have no opportunity to dissent from the practice, then 
even under such ostensibly “consensual” circumstances the custom 
should be viewed with suspicion. 
The second exception is when the custom is standing in only for 
evidence of a positive proposition, such as “this is what is generally 
done.” For example, trademark law’s determination of likelihood 
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of confusion, patent law’s interpretation of patent claims, and 
copyright’s doctrine of externalities all require consideration of 
what is generally done in an industry. Nevertheless, if a custom is 
not certain, it should still be viewed as having no value regardless 
of the proposition for which it is used. 
When all of the vectors indicate that the custom is of the highest 
value, it is worth giving consideration to the developed practice. 
Creative Commons Public Licenses (CCPLs) and General Public 
Licenses (GPLs) are good examples of customs that have all high-
est value vector points.248 They are certain customs, expressly set 
forth in relevant literature by their creators and in explicit contract 
terms in the applicable licenses. They are both developed with as-
pirational motivations—that is, they seek to provide a preferred al-
location of IP rights. They are developed and entered into volun-
tarily by both IP owners and users, and by parties with different 
levels of financing and power. When applied to the parties that en-
tered the licenses, there is no reason not to consider these custom-
ary practices and norms. 
Applying such practices to third parties, however, is problematic. 
Consider one potential risk of the Creative Commons project: as 
more and more authors adopt the CCPLs, those who do not may 
be viewed by courts as having an even more restrictive copyright. It 
would not be surprising to find courts narrowing their views of 
what constitutes fair use in light of the availability of CCPLs. For 
example, if someone does not use a CCPL that allows noncommer-
cial uses, a court may be less likely to allow such noncommercial 
uses, concluding that customary practices require an author to dis-
tribute a work under a CCPL for such uses to be “fair.” Although 
the Creative Commons website and licenses clearly state that the 
licenses do not alter existing copyright law (in particular the scope 
of fair dealing or fair use), the success of the project may well have 
unintended consequences of altering copyright law itself.249 Under 
 
248 See discussion supra Subsection I.B.3. 
249 The Creative Commons license states, “Nothing in this license is intended to re-
duce, limit, or restrict any rights arising from fair use, first sale or other limitations on 
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner under copyright law or other applicable 
laws.” Creative Commons, Legal Code, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
nd/2.5/legalcode (last visited Nov. 13, 2007). I note that the new version 3.0 license 
states this somewhat differently: “Fair Dealing Rights. Nothing in this License is in-
tended to reduce, limit, or restrict any uses free from copyright or rights arising from 
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my approach, this will not happen because these practices and li-
censes should not be extended beyond the consenting participants 
to alter analysis in other situations. 
For customs that are situated along the “some value” category of 
the various vectors, or a combination of “some value” and “highest 
value” ranges depending on the particular vector, judgment calls 
are more difficult. The more a custom lies in the “highest value” 
column along multiple vectors, the more valuable it is for evaluat-
ing the scope of IP rights in a given instance. The more a custom 
falls in the gray zone indicating it only has “some value,” the more 
important it is for any legal conclusions to be supported by clear 
and convincing alternative bases. Any uncertainty about the value 
of a custom should weigh against consideration of that custom by 
courts and factfinders. If this approach seems restrictive, it is—but 
that is because the use of custom is so questionable to begin with in 
the context of IP. 
CONCLUSION 
There are a number of important implications that follow from 
this analysis of the treatment of customs in de facto and de jure IP 
law. First, recent efforts to expand the access and use of IP through 
best practices statements, reliance on custom in fair use analysis, 
and alternative IP regimes, such as the Creative Commons and 
open-source software, may unwittingly backfire by reinforcing the 
incorporation of customs without providing any theoretical frame-
work to justify favoring their open-access practices. By buying into 
the value of customs in IP, such approaches will likely shore up the 
influence of the dominant and pervasive customary practices, such 
as licensing norms and restrictive fair use guidelines. 
Second, because my theoretical framework confers greater value 
on unanimously accepted customary practices, users and owners of 
IP should be encouraged to publicly dissent from restrictive and 
suboptimal practices and norms. Such dissent may make it more 
likely that courts will question if there really is a relevant and ap-
 
limitations or exceptions that are provided for in connection with the copyright pro-
tection under copyright law or other applicable laws.” Id., 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode (last visited Nov. 13, 
2007). 
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plicable custom. Moreover, because the source of motivation for 
customary practices also matters, participants in the creation and 
use of IP should be encouraged to state when conformity with a 
custom is generated by litigation avoidance rather than an expres-
sion of a preferred delineation of rights. 
Third, if courts begin to recognize their widespread considera-
tion of custom and consider more thoughtfully when custom 
should—and should not—be considered in IP cases, many of the 
pressures driving the clearance culture will dissipate. As a result, 
court decisions will better reflect the goals behind protecting IP, as 
well as the intentions of the parties that have generated these prac-
tices and norms. 
Finally, IP provides a useful lens to consider how custom should 
be treated more generally in the law. The analysis of IP reinforces 
concerns that custom will develop in suboptimal ways, often driven 
by rent-seeking, powerful participants. Moreover, in areas of the 
law where it does not make sense to further expectation interests, 
or where expectations run against treating custom as legally bind-
ing, it generally does not make sense to incorporate custom. Addi-
tionally, when a body of law, such as IP, is directed toward an in-
teraction with the public more broadly, a preference should be 
given to public rather than private ordering. 
Custom can be a useful device, even in IP, but customary prac-
tices and norms need to be put into perspective. It is the rare in-
stance in which custom should drive legal determinations in IP. 
Nevertheless, customary practices and norms do provide some 
relevant, nonprejudicial information for IP cases. When a custom is 
certain, representative, aspirational, and applied against in-group 
members for a positive proposition, it is at its peak value. When a 
custom is pragmatic, unrepresentative, uncertain, and likely to 
foreclose any use without explicit permission or permit all uses of 
another’s IP, it should be dismissed. 
The development of a sound theoretical basis for the use of cus-
tom is critical to shaping the future of IP. The value of many pro-
jects to reclaim public access to IP works may turn on how custom 
is treated by the courts and, in practice, by the IP industries. The 
unarticulated incorporation of custom threatens to swallow up IP 
law and replace it with industry-led IP regimes that give the public 
and other creators more limited rights to access and use IP than 
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were envisioned by the Constitution and Congress. If we take seri-
ously the notion that IP is protected in the public interest, then we 
cannot abdicate the boundaries of IP rights to delineation by pri-
vately developed customary practices. Requiring explicit acknowl-
edgement of the consideration of custom and limiting considera-
tion of custom to the narrow circumstances that I have outlined 
may be the only path back from a world in which legislated and 
constitutional limits on IP law become irrelevant. 
